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ore and more ques tions have arisen re cently in the
Na tional Bank of Hun gary about repo mar kets. The
topic came into the lime light with the lat est changes of
mon e tary pol icy in stru ments. In ad di tion, spec u la tive ac  -
tiv ity on repo mar kets has given rise to some in ter est ing
ques tions. 
We have tried to sum up the main char ac ter is tics of
repos be gin ning with the def i ni tions and with the prac tices
of in ter na tional and Hun gar ian repo mar kets. We have at  -
tempted to in ves ti gate whether the size of the Hun gar ian
repo mar ket is re ally as in sig nif i cant as sta tis tics show.
Finally, we make a few sug ges tions which may in crease
the ef fec tive ness of mon e tary pol icy by the stim u la tion of
repo mar kets. Given that Hun gar ian lit er a ture on this topic
is very scarce, our study is mainly based on for eign pub li  -
ca tions and con sul ta tions with mar ket par tic i pants. 
When ana lys ing the Hun gar ian repo mar ket we
faced a lot of prob lem atic ques tions, some of them we
have al ready met, oth ers we faced here for the first time.
These prob lems arise be cause of the lack of over all reg u  -
la tion, the mis in ter pre ta tion of ex ist ing reg u la tions, the
re serve re quire ments of the Na tional Bank, the set tle ment 
and ac count ing stan dards of repos, and be cause of the
in suf fi cient knowl edge of mar ket par tic i pants. 
We would like to ex press our spe cial thanks to Dr  Éva
Istvánovics and Dr Krisztina Bana for their help with le gal
ques tions, and to Balázs Romhányi and Enikõ Gyulafalvi
for the trans la tion of Ger man and French pub li ca tions.
We would also like to thank all those peo ple who helped
us with their re mark able ideas and ex pe ri ences in cre at ing 
this study. 
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Prefacerepos con sist of a
loan of se cu ri ties in
one di rec tion and a
loan of cash in the
other 
The name ‘repo’ co mes from the ex pres sion ‘sale and re pur chase
agree ment’ and cov ers a trans ac tion where the two par ties in volved
agree to do two deals as a pack age. The first deal is a prompt sale of
a se cu rity – most of ten a gov ern ment bond –  fol lowed by a re verse
trans ac tion on a fu ture date. The first deal of the trans ac tion is of ten
called the first leg, while the fu ture deal is usu ally called the sec ond
leg of the repo. Be cause the cash and se cu rity trans fers of the first
leg are re versed on a fu ture date, repo deals are equiv a lent to a loan
of se cu ri ties in one di rec tion and a loan of cash in the other. 
Ac cord ing to the typ i cal repo agree ment, rights con nected to
the bor rowed se cu ri ties (in come and cap i tal gains/losses) re main
with their orig i nal owner. Repos are driven by ei ther the need to lend
or bor row cash – which is collateralised by se cu ri ties – or the need to
bor row spe cific se cu ri ties. Prices of the prompt sale and the sub se  -
quent re pur chase are agreed at the out set. The dif fer ence be tween
the two prices is cal cu lated to be equiv a lent to the cost of a se cured
loan. 
the two (es sen tial)
par ties of a repo
The two (es sen tial) par ties of a repo are the  seller (or lender),
who sells his se cu ri ties at the prompt deal and re pur chases them on
a fu ture date, and the buyer (or bor rower or in ves tor) who grants a
collateralised cash loan. This ter mi nol ogy is taken from the bond
mar ket, not the money mar ket – the party bor row ing cash is usu ally
known as the lender in the repo. 
If the repo is driven by the in ves tor’s pur pose of lend ing money,
he is not in ter ested in the ex act con di tions (yield, ma tu rity etc.) of
the col lat eral, though it is im por tant for him that the col lat eral is trad  -
able and that the is suer is credit-worthy. This is why gov ern ment pa  -
pers are the most fre quently used se cu ri ties as col lat eral. 
Repos can be driven by the need of se cu rity bor row ing if the
buyer is short of a par tic u lar se cu rity. In this case it is very im por tant
for him to re ceive the spe cific se cu ri ties he is short of – thus the col  -
lat eral is called spe cial, as op posed to gen eral col lat eral (GC). The
ex tent to which any par tic u lar se cu rity be comes spe cial de pends
on the sup ply of, and de mand for that se cu rity in the mar ket gen er  -
ally. The more spe cial the se cu rity, the lower the repo in ter est rate
can be.  
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1. | Def i ni tion and the dif fer ent types 
| of repothe main at trac tions
of repo
Repos gen er ally have short ma tu rity vary ing be tween one day
(O/N) and one year. Flex i ble ma tu rity is one of the main at trac tions
of repo – it gives a wide range of  pos si bil i ties for in vest ing cash on
dif fer ent time ho ri zons. Yet this is only one ad van tage of repos. Since 
repos are collateralised loans, the low risk makes them very pop u lar
with in ves tors. If the seller de faults in re pay ing the cash, the buyer
(in ves tor) can keep the collateralised se cu ri ties. It is ad vis able for
the in ves tor to check the credit worthi ness of both the seller and the
is suer of the col lat eral prior to the deal. The ad van tage of the repo for 
the bor rower of the cash is that he can make use of an in vest ment in
his port fo lio to bor row funds ei ther rel a tively cheaply, or which he
might not oth er wise be able to bor row at all. 
1.1 Main types of repo
repos can be clas si  -
fied by many fac tors
Repos can be clas si fied by many fac tors. In terms of ma tu rity a dif  -
fer ence can be made be tween term and open (or day-to-day) repo.
If the pe riod is not fixed and agreed in ad vance, it is an ‘open repo’.
In this case both par ties have the right to call for the repo to be ter  -
mi nated at any time, al though of ten re quir ing two days’ no tice. In an 
open repo, the repo in ter est rate changes each day – ef fec tively the
repo is rolled over each day. The al ter na tive is a ‘term repo’, where













of cash plus interest
At the maturity of the repo seller repays the cash increased
by the interest
Flows of the future deal
Flows of the repofrom the view point of
the coun ter parts 
From the view point of the coun ter parts a repo can be repo  or
re verse repo. The same trans ac tion is a repo for the seller, who sells
his se cu ri ties on the first leg and re pur chases them on the fu ture
date, while it is a re verse repo (or sim ply re verse) for the buyer, who
buys the se cu ri ties in the first deal and re sells them on the fu ture
date. 
the own er ship of the
col lat eral
If the own er ship of the col lat eral is trans ferred to the buyer, the
deal is called a de liv ery repo. The buyer has the right to use the se cu  -
ri ties dur ing the term of the repo, but is obliged to re turn them to the
seller at ma tu rity. If the se cu ri ties are pledged for the ben e fi ciary of
the buyer, but the own er ship re mains with the seller, the deal is called 
a hold-in-custody repo. If the seller de faults on re pay ing the cash
loan at the end of the deal, the own er ship of the se cu ri ties is au to  -
mat i cally trans ferred to the buyer. 
Repos can be sub di vided into three ba sic con struc tions: the
clas sic repo, the buy/sell-back and se cu ri ties lend ing. The eco nom  -
ics of the deal is the same in all three cases.
1.1.1 Classic repo
clas sic repo con tracts
are usu ally based on
the PSA agree ment
Clas sic repo con tracts are usu ally based on the PSA agree ment in
the USA, while in Eu rope the PSA/ISMA Global Mas ter Repo Agree  -
ment is the most widely used stan dard.
Cou pon pay ments (of the col lat eral) dur ing the term of de liv ery 
repo are re ceived by the buyer, who is obliged to make a match ing
pay ment to the seller at the end of the deal. In the case of a
hold-in-custody repo, the se cu ri ties re main in the seller’s pos ses  -
sion, thus cou pon pay ments are re ceived by him, too. 
In in ter na tional prac tice, repos gen er ally in volve gross-paying
se cu ri ties, that is se cu ri ties where the is suer pays the cou pons gross, 
with out de duc tion of in come tax. The GMRA is de signed for
gross-paying se cu ri ties. Un der the GMRA, if the buyer does re ceive
any pay ments of net tax, he is still li a ble to pay the gross amount to
the seller. Clearly the two par ties in volved can in stead es tab lish a dif  -
fer ent agree ment for net-paying se cu ri ties if they chose. 
Price calculation
the price of the repo is 
the repo in ter est rate
The price of the repo is the repo in ter est rate, which ap pears as the
dif fer ence of the cash flows in the two legs of the repo. In the spot
trans ac tion the bor rower pays the price of the se cu rity and in the fu  -
ture deal he gets back the same amount plus the ac crued repo in ter  -
est. Since se cu ri ties trans acted in repo deals are used as col lat eral,
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REPO MARKETSthe price paid for them can dif fer from the ac tual mar ket price – it
usu ally con tains a hair cut (or in some cases a dis count). 
In the case of a hold-in-custody repo, the cash flow of the sec  -
ond leg con tains only the orig i nal pur chase price and the repo in ter  -
est rate, but it does not con tain the in ter est on the se cu rity ac crued
dur ing the term of the repo. The rea son for this is that the pa pers re  -
main in the prop erty of the seller and so the cash-flows in volved are
cred ited on his ac count. 
In a de liv ery repo, the prop erty of the col lat eral passes to the
buyer, so he will be re ceiv ing the ac tual cou pon pay ments. These in  -
flows must be re paid to the seller at the end of the deal. 
the driv ing forces of
repos
The cal cu la tion above sup poses that the deal is driven by the
seller’s need to lend a par tic u lar amount of se cu ri ties. Here the cash
flows are to be cal cu lated on the ba sis of the nom i nal amount and the 
con di tions of the bond trans acted. This is typ i cal with  se cu rity-
 driven repos when the lender does not need his se cu ri ties for a cer  -
tain pe riod of time and he wants to make use of his port fo lio. An other 
group of repos are based on the need for lend ing or bor row ing
money; these are the so called cash-driven repos. In cash-driven
deals the amount of cash lent is given, so the nom i nal amount of se  -
cu ri ties trans acted needs to be cal cu lated. 
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1 Repo cal cu la tions can be based ei ther on 360 or 365 days de pend ing on the coun ter parts.
Banks pre fer us ing 360 days as a stan dard for the in ter bank mar ket, and bro ker age firms rather use
the 365-day year as it is usual for bond cal cu la tions.
Cash flow of the first leg = nom i nal amount of bond x (net price + ac  -
crued in ter est) / 100
Cash flow of the sec ond leg:
Hold-in-custody repo:  spot cash flow x (1 + repo in ter est x term of the repo
/ 360 or 365
2)
De liv ery repo:  spot cash flow x (1 + repo in ter est x term of the repo / 360 
or 365) + acccrued in ter est dur ing the term of the repo  x  (1 + repo in ter est
x T),
where T = num ber of days be tween cou pon pay ment and the ma tu rity of
repo/ 360 v. 365.
Cash flows of the repo
Nom i nal amount of se cu ri ties = spot cash flow/ (net price + ac crued in ter  -
est) / 100
Cash flow on the fu ture date = spot cash flow x (1 + repo in ter est rate x
term of repo / 360 or 365)
Calculation of cash-driven dealsCollateral management
The price of the col lat eral dur ing the term of the repo can change as
mar ket in ter est rates vary. To bal ance these price changes it is ad  -
vis able to re cal cu late the value of the col lat eral daily and to check
whether the ac tual mar ket value of the se cu ri ties equals the value of
the cash lent. Should the value of the col lat eral fall, the buyer may
re quire a mar gin call, which means that the seller needs to trans fer
ex tra col lat eral or cash to the buyer. If  the value of the col lat eral
rises rather than falls, the seller can sim i larly make a mar gin call, re  -




Re val u a tion of the col lat eral (mark ing to mar ket) is usu ally ex  -
er cised daily. If the hair cut (or ini tial mar gin) is high enough, daily
mark ing to mar ket is not nec es sary. High hair cut means dis ad van  -
tage for the seller who gets less cash for the same amount of se cu rity
than he would re ceive by daily mark ing to mar ket. For the lender,
high hair cut is ad van ta geous be cause he is cov ered even at higher
price falls of the col lat eral (as long as the hair cut is higher than the
price loss). 
The ex tent of hair cut rate de pends both on the type of col lat eral 
man age ment ap plied and on the cred i bil ity of the coun ter parts. If the 
cred i bil ity of the seller is higher than that of the buyer, the amount of
the cash lent can ex ceed the value of the col lat eral. Since bond
prices are con stantly chang ing, there would be small trans fers of col  -
lat eral each day if the col lat eral value were al ways to be marked to
mar ket pre cisely. To avoid the ad min is tra tive costs and bur den of
this, the two par ties agree a thresh old, be low which changes in the
col lat eral’s value do not trig ger a mar gin call. 
When mark ing to mar ket the col lat eral, it is the dirty price in  -
clud ing ac crued cou pon that is con sid ered, be cause this is the
amount of money which could be real ised by the buyer by sell ing
the col lat eral if nec es sary.  Sim i larly,  the amount of cash which is se  -
cured  by the col lat eral takes ac count of ac crued in ter est on the
cash.
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Cash paid at first leg = (nom i nal amount of bond  x (net price + ac crued in  -
ter est) / 100) / (1 + hair cut rate)
Cash re paid at the sec ond leg = cash paid at the be gin ning x (1 + repo in  -
ter est rate xnumber of days / 360 or 365) 
Hair cut cal cu la tionIn some mar kets, where the se cu ri ties set tle ment sys tem is not
ready for daily mark ing to mar ket, re ad just ing the value of the col lat  -
eral can be im ple mented by clos ing the orig i nal trans ac tion and
open ing a new repo deal with the same ma tu rity and value as the
orig i nal. In some cases the new deal is not based on the cash lent but
on the amount of se cu ri ties trans acted in the orig i nal deal. This is
usual when the repo is se cu rity-driven.
Substitution
to re place the orig i nal 
col lat eral with other
se cu ri ties
If coun ter parts agree (and the set tle ment sys tem is well enough de  -
vel oped), it might be pos si ble to re place the orig i nal col lat eral with
other se cu ri ties dur ing the term of the repo. If the deal is not se cu  -
rity- but cash-driven, it is not im por tant for the buyer to re ceive a
par tic u lar bond as col lat eral. How ever, it is im por tant that the col lat  -
eral has the re quired cred i bil ity and value both be fore and af ter the
sub sti tu tion. The num ber of sub sti tu tions al lowed dur ing a repo is
usu ally set tled in the repo agree ment. Sub sti tu tion is gen er ally not
al lowed with se cu rity-driven repos, since it would ne gate the orig i  -
nal pur pose of the buyer.  
The fol low ing sec tion de scribes some of the most pop u lar sub  -
types of  clas sic repo. 
Bilateral, tri-party and hold-in-custody repos
risks can be low ered
by hir ing a triparty
agent
Repos dis cussed above had one thing in com mon: they all had two
coun ter parts. These are the so called bi lat eral repos. It may oc cur,
though, that the two par ties hire a tri-party agent as a cus to dian. In
this case the seller trans fers the se cu ri ties to the tri-party agent, who 
keeps the pa pers on a sep a rate ac count on the buyer’s be half. The
cus to dian’s du ties in clude:
– as sur ing DVP set tle ment at each end of the deal;
– daily re port ing of the value of col lat eral for both par ties;
– en sur ing that the col lat eral sat is fies the buyer’s cri te ria in all
re spect;
– daily mark ing to mar ket in or der to en sure that the col lat eral
is ad e quate;
– over see ing any sub sti tu tion.
The agree ment with the cus to dian is set tled in a sep a rate con tract be tween the three
par ties. The cus to dian’s fee charges the seller. In Eu rope Euroclear and Cedel – in ter  -
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REPO MARKETSna tional clear ing houses – are the two main cus to di ans in volved in cross-border repo
set tle ments, while in the US it is the Bank of New York or the Chem i cal Bank. 
The Hun gar ian Cen tral De pos i tory and Clear ing House (KELER) signed a cus to dian
agree ment with Cedel Bank in 1996. Un der this agree ment it is now pos si ble for
Cedel-client for eign in ves tors to di rectly set tle their Hun gar ian se cu ri ties trans ac tions. 
The agree ment also made pos si ble for cross-border se cu ri ties trans ac tions of Hun gar -
ian banks, bro ker age firms and cus to dian banks to be set tled through Keler, and for
their rights con nected to the se cu ri ties to be ex er cised while hold ing the pa pers at
Keler.   
ad van tage and dis ad  -
van tage of the
tri-party repo
With a tri-party repo it is a dis ad van tage for the buyer that he
can not use the se cu ri ties dur ing the term of the repo. How ever, it is
ben e fi cial for the seller be cause he has the pos si bil ity of sub sti tu tion.
If, for ex am ple, he needs the col lat eral for an other trans ac tion dur ing
the term of the repo, he can sub sti tute the orig i nal pa pers with other
ad e quate se cu ri ties on the buyer’s ac count. The par tic i pa tion of the
third party is ad van ta geous for the buyer be cause it guar an tees that
the col lat eral is uniquely used for the repo. There are some other ad  -
van tages of the tri-party repo for the buyer: 
– the seller might pay higher repo rate for the pos si bil ity of sub  -
sti tu tion;
– low part ner risk se cured by the in de pend ent cus to dian;
– low ad min is tra tive and le gal costs.
Tri-party repo was ini tially used ex clu sively by cen tral banks
for ob tain ing more se cu rity in set tle ments. Mar ket par tic i pants be  -
gan us ing this form of repo later. Se cu rity of set tle ment cer tainly has
its price: lo cal cus to di ans of de vel oped mar kets usu ally charge a fee
of 1.5–4 ba sis points for repo set tle ments. Fees usu ally de crease
pro por tion ally with the in crease of quan tity. At the end of 1997, 70%
of the one tril lion dol lar Amer i can O/N repo mar ket in volved
tri-party repos. At the same time, ac cord ing to Euroclear re ports,
only 25% of the 170 bil lion dol lar turn over on the  Eu ro pean O/N
repo mar ket was trans acted as tri-party repos. Al though the pro por  -
tion of tri-party repos is con stantly grow ing, the growth is lim ited
both by the ex tra costs and the infrastructural bur dens of de pos i to  -
ries. 
dif fer ence be tween
the clas si cal
hold-in-custody repo
and tri-party repo
If the term of repo is very short or if the seller wishes to make
sub sti tu tion, the trans fer costs of the se cu ri ties might end up rel a  -
tively too high. The clas si cal hold-in-custody repo elim i nates this
prob lem by leav ing the se cu ri ties on the seller’s seg re gated ac count. 
For the buyer, this cer tainly means a higher part ner risk, which en  -
ables him to ask for higher repo rate. As in the case of tri-party repo,
the buyer does not have the right to use the col lat eral dur ing the clas  -
12 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
REPO MARKETSsi cal hold-in-custody repo. This type of repo is very con ve nient for
the seller, be cause all the ad min is tra tion is car ried out by the cus to  -
dian, and in ad di tion he has the right for sub sti tu tion. It is note wor thy
that the col lat eral can only be used for one deal at a time.
Repos of the Na tional Bank of Hun gary (NBH) are tri-party repos rather than clas si cal
hold-in-custody repos. The se cu rity set tle ment is done by a third party (KELER), as
is usual with tri-party repos,  bu t the  cash set tle ment is done by the NBH, not by
KELER. 
The seg re ga tion of the se cu ri ties and cash set tle ment is due to the fact that KELER is
not author ised to open cash set tle ment ac counts for its cli ents; that is done by the
NBH in the case of banks. The set tle ment of repos is DVP, thanks to the so called ”hot
line” con nec tion be tween KELER and NBH.
The se cu ri ties set tle ment sys tem in Hun gary is not yet pre pared for sub sti tu tion dur  -
ing the term of repos. Be cause of the rel a tively short ma tu rity of repos in Hun gary,
sub sti tu tion has not been a real need un til now (NBH repos are mainly O/N, only the
re cently in tro duced and very rarely ap plied quick ten der repos and the not yet ap plied 
nor mal ten der repos might have ma tu rity lon ger than one day). The im por tance of
sub sti tu tion is much higher with mar ket repos (see later).  
It does not seem nec es sary to change the NBH’s repos from hold-in-custody type to
de liv ery repos. Dur ing the term of repos, the NBH does not use the col lat eral, it only
serves as guar an tee. 
De liv ery repo would be ben e fi cial for the coun ter parts of the NBH in the case of re  -
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Vari a tions of clas sic repo
As a re sult of the di ver si fied de mand, the mar ket in no vated a largevariety
of sub types of the clas sic repo. 
Eq uity repo
Repos are not al ways collateralised with gov ern ment bonds. Since the be  -
gin ning of the 1990s, repos collateralised by eq ui ties be came in creas ingly
pop u lar. The birth of eq uity repo was boosted by in vest ment com pa nies
seek ing at trac tive op por tu ni ties to make use of their large eq uity port fo lio.
Of fer ing eq ui ties as col lat eral for repos made it pos si ble to draw loans with
more fa vour able con di tions than nor mal bank cred its. This new type of
repo was also at trac tive for in ves tors with tem po rary high li quid ity, be  -
cause they could gain higher re turn on eq uity repos than on nor mal repos.
(The rea son for this is that the higher risk of eq ui ties caused by their higher
price vol a til ity and lower li quid ity in volves higher profit ex pec ta tions.) 
Op tion repo
This type of repo is most widely used in France (they call it vente a
remerée) and it is quite wide spread in Hun gary, too.  In an op tion repo, one
of the coun ter parts writes an op tion to ful fil his ob li ga tions on the sec ond
leg of the repo. This means that ei ther the se cu ri ties or the cash trans fer at
the end of the deal will be op tional, which in creases  the  risk for the  coun  -
ter part and it gives a pos si bil ity for him to mod ify the repo rate. 
Cross-currency repo
If the cash and the se cu rity trans ferred in the repo are de nom i nated in dif  -
fer ent cur ren cies, the deal is called cross-currency repo. In this case the
se cu rity has higher vol a til ity than in a nor mal repo, be cause its price is de  -
ter mined by both the in ter est rate and the ex change rate move ments. To
com pen sate for this, the buyer may re quire a higher repo rate.
 
Dol lar repo
In a dol lar repo, the buyer has the right to re-sell dif fer ent pa pers than the
orig i nal at the end of the deal. The nom i nal value of the se cu ri ties trans  -
ferred at each end of the deal have to be equal.  
For ward start repo
The first leg of a repo is nor mally set tled on the usual set tle ment date for
the se cu rity in volved. In a for ward start repo, the first leg is set tled on a
pre-agreed fu ture date. 
Flex repo
In a flex repo the cash is re paid to the buyer in stages. This is use ful, for ex  -
am ple, when the seller is us ing the repo to fi nance the pur chase of an am  -
or tis ing as set such as a mort gage-backed se cu rity.  1.1.2 Buy/sell-back
 the two legs of the
deal are set tled
within two con tracts
Buy/sell-back (B/S)  is very sim i lar to clas sic repo. The dif fer ence is 
that, un like in a clas sic repo, the two legs of the deal are han dled
within two con tracts. Buy/sell-backs are ba si cally the con se  -
quences of two straight for ward pur chase agree ments, where the
eco nom ics of the deal are the same as with a clas sic repo. 
Coupon payments
If there is a cou pon pay ment on the se cu rity dur ing the term of
buy/sell-back, it is re ceived by the buyer in the same way as in a
clas sic repo. In con trast to a clas sic repo, how ever, it is typ i cally not
then paid over to the counterparty. Clearly, this af fects the eco nom  -
ics of the deal, as the counterparty needs to be com pen sated. The
com pen sa tion is usu ally taken into ac count in the pric ing of the se  -
cu rity. 
If there is no cou pon pay ment dur ing the term of buy/sell-back, 
the cash amount paid at the end of the deal can be cal cu lated as be  -
low.
If there is cou pon pay ment dur ing the term of deal, the cash re  -
paid at the end must be de creased by the amount of the cou pon re  -




In this, gen er ally a lon ger-term repo, the repo in ter est rate is re-set at
pre-determined in ter vals ac cord ing to such bench mark such as LIBOR.
In France, float ing rate repos based on the do mes tic TMP in dex are com  -
mon. 
Re verse to Ma tu rity
In a re verse to ma tu rity, the ma tu rity date of the repo is the same as the ma  -
tu rity date of the se cu rity used as col lat eral. The re verse to ma tu rity is ba si  -
cally equal to the out right sell ing of the se cu rity used as col lat eral. 
Cash paid at the end of the deal = (orig i nal pur chase price + ac crued in ter  -
est) x  (1 + B/S in ter est x t),
where: t= pe riod in days  / 360 v. 365.
Cash paid at the end of the buy/sell-backthe cou pon re ceived dur ing the term of the deal, his earn ing on this
also needs to be de ducted from the seller’s re pay ment. (A usual as  -
sump tion is that the cou pon can be in vested at the orig i nal repo rate;
al though un likely to be cor rect, the ef fect of us ing a dif fer ent rate
would gen er ally be very small.)  
The gen eral for mula for cal cu lat ing the cash re pay ment in a
buy/sell-back with cou pon pay ment is the fol low ing.
If there are any other pay ments due on the col lat eral dur ing the
buy/sell-back, these need to be taken into ac count in the same way
as cou pon pay ments. 
no sub sti tu tion
within buy/sell-backs
As the two legs of the trans ac tion are sep a rate, there is no pos  -
si bil ity of sub sti tut ing one se cu rity for an other. The only pos si bil ity
for the two par ties is to agree to close out the ex ist ing buy/sell-back
and es tab lish a new deal based on the same B/S rate and ma tu rity,
but with a dif fer ent col lat eral. 
The ad van tages and dis ad van tages of buy/sell-back com pared
with clas sic repo
Dis ad van tages of buy/sell-back:
– Tra di tionally, buy/sell-backs have no spe cial con trac tual
close-out rights in the case of a de fault, since there is no le gal
doc u men ta tion to spec ify events of de fault. The in clu sion of
buy/sell-backs in the re vised PSA/ISMA doc u men ta tion,
how ever, al lows for this. 
– Buy/sell-backs have no mar gin ing rights, al though in prac  -
tice an ini tial mar gin may be taken, and vari a tion mar gin can
be achieved through clos ing out and re pric ing the trans ac  -
tion, and this is now cov ered un der the PSA/ISMA agree  -
ment. 
– In buy/sell-backs, the seller of a se cu rity has no right to the
re turn of any cou pon, and so must fac tor the ex pected cou  -
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Cash flow at the end = (orig i nal pur chase price + ac crued in ter est) x (1 +
B/S in ter est x t) – cou pon pay ment x (1 + repo in ter est rate x T),
where: t = term  of B/S in days / 360 or 365,
and T = days be tween cou pon pay ment and the ma tu rity of B/S / 360 or
365.
Cash flow at the end of a buy/sell-back with cou pon pay mentpon into the buy-back price. In prac tice there might be an un  -
der stand ing that the buyer will com pen sate the seller if he re  -
ceives a cou pon which, through over sight, has not been fac  -
tored into the for ward price.
– There are no rights of sub sti tu tion in buy/sell-backs, al though 
a buyer may be pre pared to ac cept this in prac tice through
close-out and re pric ing.
– The abil ity to net ob li ga tions, in the case of de fault, re duces
counterparty risk. This is in creas ingly re cog nised by cen tral
banks in de ter min ing cap i tal ad e quacy re quire ments, so that
un doc u mented buy/sell-backs may im ply higher cap i tal re  -
quire ments. Again, the re vised PSA/ISMA doc u men ta tion
does al low net ting and close-out for buy/sell-backs.
Ad van tages of buy/sell-back:
– A buy/sell-back is eas ier to book than a clas sic repo, as it
does not re quire sys tems for mark ing-to-market and mar gin  -
ing.
– Lack of doc u men ta tion may re duce le gal costs and shorten
the ap proval pro cess. 
– In con trast with clas sic repo, buy/sell-back is def i nitely not a
credit deal but two si mul ta neous pur chases, which in some
coun tries ( in clud ing Hun gary) in volves an ad van tage for
banks in terms of re serve re quire ments.
1.1.3 Securities lending
As men tioned ear lier, a cer tain part of repo deals are se cu  -
rity-driven, which means that the deal is mo ti vated by the buyer’s
need to bor row a par tic u lar se cu rity. It may be, how ever, that the
lender of the se cu rity does not wish cash in re turn; if he is al ready
cash-rich, then bor row ing more cash which he would then need to
place on de posit would prob a bly cost him the bid-offer spread. Nev  -
er the less, he wishes to take ad van tages of the fact that he owns a
se cu rity in short sup ply. In this case he sim ply lends the se cu ri ties
for a fee. This type of trans ac tion is called se cu rity lend ing (or stock
lend ing). 
col lat eral can be any  -
thing that is ac cepted 
by the lender
Cer tainly, the lender wishes to be se cured against de fault by the 
bor rower, and he takes col lat eral from the bor rower, usu ally in the
form of se cu ri ties. Col lat eral is not nec es sar ily some kind of se cu ri  -
ties, it can be any thing that is ac cepted by the lender. In prac tice,
gov ern ment pa pers are most com monly used as col lat eral, but CD’s, 
cash, banker’s ac cep tan ces, etc. can also be used. 
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ment like clas sic repos. The stan dard doc u men ta tion gen er ally used
in the UK for in ter na tional lend ing trans ac tions is the ‘Over seas Se  -
cu ri ties Lender’s Agree ment’ (OSLA) or the ‘Eq uity Stock Lending
Agree ment’ (ESLA), de pend ing on whether the col lat eral is bond or
eq ui ties. In the US, the doc u men ta tion used is the PSA’s ‘Mas ter Se  -
cu ri ties Loan Agree ment’. 
the ab so lute le gal ti -
tle is not al ways
trans ferred to the bor  -
rower
In se cu ri ties lend ing, the ab so lute le gal ti tle is not al ways trans  -
ferred to the bor rower as in clas sic de liv ery repo or buy/sell-backs.
Un der the OSLA agree ment, own er ship of the se cu ri ties lent is trans  -
ferred from lender to bor rower, and own er ship of the col lat eral is
trans ferred from bor rower to lender. Un der the PSA doc u men ta tion,
how ever, the trans fer of col lat eral in volves a pledge rather than an
out right trans fer of own er ship. 
If a cou pon or other pay ment is pay able on the se cu rity lent
dur ing the trans ac tion, it is the bor rower who re ceives it, and he is
obliged to make a match ing pay ment to the lender to com pen sate
him for the loss of the in come. Sim i larly, if there is a pay ment on the
col lat eral, the lender is obliged to make a match ing pay ment to the
bor rower. In se cu ri ties lend ing trans ac tions where the col lat eral is
only pledged with no trans fer of own er ship the cou pon con tin ues to
be paid to the orig i nal owner. 
Other rights at tached to the col lat eral (such as vot ing rights or
rights to con vert the se cu rity to dif fer ent se cu rity) are trans ferred to
the lender only if the agree ment al lows it. In the case of a bearer se  -
cu rity, the cur rent holder of the se cu rity (who is the bor rower) can
ex er cise the vot ing rights. The treat ment may in clude the pro vi sion
that the bor rower has to ex er cise the rights at tached to the se cu rity
lent ac cord ing to the lender’s wish. 
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Special + lending fee
Collateral
Transaction at the end:
Se cu ri ties lend ingSecurities lending in the practice 
of clearing houses
au to matic se cu ri ties
lend ing
If the trader is short of the par tic u lar se cu ri ties he needs to sell on
the set tle ment date, well-developed clear ing houses are able to set  -
tle the trans ac tion by their au to mated se cu ri ties-lending sys tems.
Au to matic se cu ri ties lend ing pro vides the as sur ance that the buyer
re ceives the se cu ri ties al ways on the set tle ment date. The clear ing
house bor rows the par tic u lar se cu ri ties from the mem bers of the
lend ing pool and lends the pa pers to the seller, who is obliged to re  -
turn the pa pers within a cer tain time. He usu ally has one-two days
to buy the pa pers in the mar ket. Au to mated se cu ri ties lend ing has
es pe cially great im por tance with multinetting sys tems, be cause
here the de fault of one sin gle player can ruin the set tle ment of all
deals of the given day. 
In Hun gary, there is an au to mated se cu ri ties lend ing sys tem con nected to KELER’s
T+2 gov ern ment bond set tle ment sys tem. The sys tem op er ates as fol lows.
Dealers, who have a se cu ri ties ac count with KELER, de posit their gov ern ment pa pers
(which they don’t need tem po rarily) in the so-called ‘tech ni cal gov ern ment pa per
pool’. The clear ing mem bers of the T+2 set tle ment sys tem who are short of the se cu ri  -
ties at T+1 are au to mat i cally cred ited with the pa pers they lack, un less the pool does
not have the re quired pa per or the mem ber does not have the cash value of the re  -
quired se cu ri ties on his ac count. 
The pe riod of the se cu rity-loan can not be more than three days. Au to matic lend ing is
im ple mented on the af ter noon of T+1, when there are no more trans fers on the ac  -
counts. Set tle ment is done on T+2, and the bor rower re turns the pa pers on T+3. Af ter
this, KELER cred its the ac count of the lender with the re turned pa pers. 
This se cu ri ties lend ing sys tem is in di rect, which means that all the mem bers have
agree ments with KELER; they don’t nec es sar ily know each other. KELER does not
take guar an tee against com pa nies tak ing part in the se cu ri ties lend ing. It main tains
the ac counts needed for the se cu ri ties lend ing, makes the reg is tra tions, keeps con  -
tacts with the lend ers, mon i tors collaterals, es tab lishes lim its and im ple ments emer  -
gency mea sures in case of de fault. Un til now, there has been no need for the au to  -
mated se cu ri ties lend ing, be cause there have not been any de faults since the im ple  -
men ta tion of the sys tem. 
au to matic se cu ri ties
lend ing en hances the 
se cu rity of set tle ment
sys tems
A se cu ri ties lend ing sys tem can en hance the se cu rity of a lo cal
set tle ment sys tem if the se cu rity pool con tains a large quan tity of
pa pers with ap pro pri ate qual ity. It works only if the sys tem as sures
high se cu rity and at trac tive yield for its mem bers, and does not
charge the bor row ers too high fees.
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of synthetic repo
com bi na tion of other
trans ac tions 
called syn thetic repos
Repos can be sub sti tuted by a com bi na tion of other trans ac tions.
These (non straight for ward deals) are called syn thetic repos.
Buy/sell-backs are also ex am ples of syn thetic repos, but be cause of 
their pop u lar ity they are con sid ered as a sub type of repos. 
A lit tle bit more com pli cated than the buy/sell-back, the to tal
re turn (TR) swap com bined with the sale of the ref er ence as set is
also very pop u lar in some coun tries, and the eco nom ics of the deal is 
equal to a clas sic repo. 
Like most swaps, a TR swap does not in volve the phys i cal
trans fer of the un der ly ing as set, only the net ting of the po si tions is
done at the end of the deal. With a TR swap, the risk of re val u a tion of
the ref er ence bond is trans ferred with the ac crued in ter est to the
counterparty in ex change for the safe fixed in ter est. The trans ac tion
is as fol lows: B owns bond C, but he does not want to take the credit
and mar ket risk of the bond for a pe riod of time. There fore he agrees
with A (who is will ing to take higher risk in or der to achieve higher re  -
turn) that A will take over these risks and the yield of bond C with out
hav ing to make the out lay of cash re quired to pur chase the bond. So
A ac cepts both the up side and the down side of bond C, while party B
has no ex po sure to ei ther. B re ceives the pre-determined
LIBOR+spread in ter est rate. A is lucky if there is no sig nif i cant down  -
side in yield C in the given pe riod, and the re turn of C will be higher
than the pre-determined in ter est he is obliged to pay for B.
The TR swap, when com bined with a sale of the ref er ence as  -
set, can be a sub sti tute for a repo trans ac tion. For ex am ple, turn the
sit u a tion around so that party A and not party B al ready owns bond
C and wants to fi nance it. Party A could achieve this by sell ing bond
C to party B and si mul ta neously en ter ing into a TR swap agree ment
with party B. At the ma tu rity of the deal A has an op tion to re pur  -
chase the bond from B (or from some body else). This syn thetic
trans ac tion gives the same cash flows as a de liv ery repo and so the




Total return on bond C 
LIBOR + X bp
Total return swapeco nom ics of the deals are the same, too. If we con sider A as the
seller and B as the buyer of a de liv ery repo, the TR swap pro duces
the same re sult. 
A TR swap has a num ber of ad van tages com par ing to a repo:
– In some coun tries the costs of swap and sale trans ac tions are
lower than repo’s (in clud ing the costs of staff and pledg ing).
– It is more flex i ble than repo, since both par ties can im ple ment 
the syn thetic trans ac tions with more par ties. The coun ter  -
parts have the free dom to de cide whether they make a re pur  -
chase agree ment for the un der ly ing pa per or they keep their
po si tion ex ist ing at the end of the deal.
– Prob a bly the most im por tant rea son why TR swaps are so
pop u lar is that many deal ers’ port fo lios con tain huge
high-risk bond and repo po si tions. The col lat eral of repo have 
to be pre sented in the bal ance sheet be cause the re pur chase
trans ac tion is an or ganic part of the deal. This means that
even if the dealer repos out his high-risk pa pers for the re  -
port ing pe riod, they will still neg a tively af fect the re sults of
the com pany. Com panies with tight bal ance sheets need to
find a so lu tion to make their risky as sets ‘dis ap pear’ from
their bal ance sheet dur ing the re port ing pe riod. TR swap
com bined with the sale of the ref er ence bond is a per fect tool
for this – the as set tem po rally dis ap pears from the bal ance
sheet, but the risk re mains with the seller. The buyer needs to
be mo ti vated not to make a repo with the same eco nom ics of
deal as op posed to a TR swap. This can be achieved, for ex  -
am ple, by higher yield. (It is of ten said that com pa nies with a
tight bal ance sheet buy the un ex ploited pos si bil i ties of com  -
pa nies with high re serves.) When repos are sub sti tuted with
TR swaps and si mul ta neous bond sales, it is usual for the vol  -
ume of repo deals to be much higher dur ing the month and to




Total return on bond C
LIBOR + X bp
Bond C
Cash
TR swap + sale of bondLack of le gal reg u la tion and cus tom ary law can be an ob sta cle
to the use or at least a fac tor de creas ing the pop u lar ity of the
above-mentioned trans ac tion. Even ISDA (the as so ci a tion of fer ing
the wid est range of doc u men ta tion on credit de riv a tives) does not
have in ter na tional stan dards for TR swaps.
1.2 Factors affecting repo rates
there are nu mer ous
fac tors in flu enc ing
the repo rate
Repo rates are gen er ally lower than in ter bank lend ing rates. The
sim ple rea son for this is that repos can be con sid ered as col lat  -
eral-backed loans. In ad di tion, there are nu mer ous other fac tors in  -
flu enc ing the repo rate: 
– Repo rates are based on com pa ra ble money mar ket rates
(de pos its, CD) rather than on bond yields. 
– Bond mar ket con di tions do af fect repo rates, how ever. In a
gen er ally bear ish bond mar ket, when deal ers are short ing
bonds and need to bor row them, repo rates will tend to be
lower. Con versely, in a bull mar ket for bonds, deal ers need to
fi nance their po si tions, which tends to raise repo rates. 
– The repo rates should be higher when the mar ket in the par  -
tic u lar col lat eral is less liq uid, be cause the buyer can less
eas ily real ise the value of the col lat eral in the event of de fault.
– A right of col lat eral sub sti tu tion pro vides a con ve nience for
the seller and an ad min is tra tive bur den and loss of flex i bil ity
for the buyer, for which the seller must be will ing to pay. The
higher the num ber of sub sti tu tions al lowed, the higher the
repo rate in gen eral. 
– A hold-in-custody repo is more ex pen sive than a de liv ery
repo be cause of the greater credit risk to the buyer. The risk,
and hence the rate, for a tri-party repo lies be tween the clas  -
sic hold-in-custody and the de liv ery repo.
– Repo rate is most likely low ered when col lat eral is spe cial.
The lower the sup ply for the se cu rity, the lower the repo rate
can be – some times sev eral per cent age points be low the nor  -
mal cost of funds. 
An open repo on which the repo rate is re-set daily, for ex am ple
at an agreed spread com pared to over night in ter est rates, should be
cheaper than a re newed over night repo with the same ma tu rity. Al  -
though the over night repo can be can be closed at a day’s no tice and
the col lat eral can be sub sti tuted, the costs in curred each day with
over night repos through trans fer ring cash and se cu ri ties are
avoided.
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One of the main at trac tions of repo is its low risk. The use of col lat  -
eral in volves a sig nif i cantly lower risk for these deals than nor mal
loans, but there are still some fac tors that al low the pos si bil ity of de  -
fault.
the risk that the
coun ter part will de  -
fault is called
counterparty risk
At first glance one might think that the coun ter parts of the repo
are cov ered from all risks, be cause they send their cash and se cu rity
trans fer at the same time to each other, so they re ceive an as set
equal in value to what they have trans ferred. This pre sumes that
both par ties ful fil their ob li ga tions both at the be gin ning and at the
end of the deal. The risk that the coun ter part will de fault is called
counterparty risk. To elim i nate or at least di min ish counterparty risk 
it is worth while agree ing with a clear ing house, which as sures DVP
set tle ment. 
the is suer of the col  -
lat eral will be come
bank rupt
In a de liv ery repo, the buyer also has to face the is suer risk,
which is the risk that the is suer of the col lat eral will be come bank  -
rupt. If the is suer be comes bank rupt, and so the seller of the repo
does not want to re pur chase the col lat eral, the owner of the pa pers
(the buyer) will pos sess a claim of low pri or ity against the is suer
com pany. In this case his claim can be un ful filled. (With an eq uity
repo the sit u a tion can be even worse, be cause share hold ers stand at
the very end of the line at wind ing up.) To re duce is suer risk, gov ern  -
ment pa pers are the most fre quently used as col lat eral in repos. 
a sig nif i cant change
in the value of the col  -
lat eral can cause se ri  -
ous losses
Even if the col lat eral is gov ern ment bond, with lon ger term
repos a sig nif i cant change in the value of the col lat eral can cause se  -
ri ous losses if there is no reg u lar mark ing to mar ket of the col lat eral.
In those coun tries where in ter est rate changes are fre quent and rel a  -
tively high, the value of fixed in come pa pers can change sig nif i cantly 
(mar ket risk). Po ten tial loss in curred from the re val u a tion of the col  -
lat eral is less with shorter term repos. Losses can be avoided by ap  -
pro pri ate col lat eral man age ment. The saf est col lat eral man age ment 
sys tem for both par ties is daily mark ing to mar ket. 
mar ket risk can  be
in creased in
cross-currency repos
Mar ket risk can be in creased in cross-currency repos. Be cause
of the dif fer ent de nom i na tion of the cash and the col lat eral trans  -
ferred, ex change rate changes also af fect the risk of the deal. This is
called ex change rate risk.
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cer tif i cate (BA)
The or i gin of the repo can be traced back to the early 20
th cen tury
United States. It was built up as an in stru ment on the ba sis of the
com mer cial credit in stru ments’ mar ket, bank guar an teed in stru  -
ments, bank ers’ ac cep tance cer tif i cate (BA) and the gov ern ment
se cu ri ties mar kets.
   The BA is not re ally avail able out side the money mar ket. There are many sim i lar i -
ties with bills of ex change or let ters of credit. It can be very ben e fi cial to use, if sec ond -
ary mar ket yields are be low the credit rates of banks, but the size of the com pany
would in volve rel a tively high trans ac tion costs of di rect par tic i pa tion in the money
mar ket.
   The BA can ap pear in sev eral forms, but the ba sis is al ways the same. The BA is
used for as sis tance in com merce over a long time. It was wide spread in the USA in
con nec tions with the im port of raw ma te ri als. The im porter does not pay for the prod -
uct im me di ately, but asks a bank to is sue a let ter of credit in fa vour of the ex porter. Re -
ceiving the let ter of credit, the ex porter dis counts it at his bank. The bank stamps “ac -
cepted” on the let ter (hence it is called BA). The se cu rity could then start to op er ate as 
a dif fer ent in stru ment; it was dis count able at the bank of is sue, it was mar ket able on
the sec ond ary mar ket or it could be a valu able part of the bank’s port fo lio for the lon -
ger run. At the be gin ning of the cen tury a huge BA sec ond ary mar ket grad u ally be gan 
to op er ate. There were banks with a desk spe cial is ing in BAs and they op er ated with
high ex per tise and safety, so the mar ket soon be come very liq uid. In many as pects
the BAs that were avail able on the sec ond ary mar ket were in the same cat e gory (or
close to it) as short ma tu rity gov ern ment se cu ri ties. Typically those in ves tors who
bought T-Bills were the buy ers of the BAs. 
Since an es sen tial por tion of USA ex ports were backed by BAs, 
af ter the 1913 es tab lish ment of the FED it be came one of its most
im por tant tasks (writ ten in the Fed eral Re serve Act) to as sist the de  -
vel op ment of the BA mar ket. The FED backed the foun da tion of BA
bro ker age com pa nies and sev eral gov ern ment bond deal ers took
part in the BA trade. At that time the FED ex pected big com mer cial
banks to take on a large por tion of re spon si bil ity for fi nanc ing BA
trad ers. Since this did not hap pen, the FED in tro duced a quo ta tion
avail able pub licly for re pur chas ing agree ments collateralised by
BAs.
in 1923 the FED in tro  -
duced the in stru ment 
of short ma tu rity repo
Dur ing the World War One the US cen tral bank in tro duced sev  -
eral in stru ments with the aim of main tain ing the level of com mer cial
bank re serves. In the be gin ning var i ous sorts of credit in stru ments
is sued by banks were pur chased. Then some prob lems emerged
with these is sues and the Fed started to in ter vene in the Trea sury’s
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2. | The origin of the repomar ket. Since the large amount of prompt pur chases were not ben e  -
fi cial for trade, in 1923 the FED in tro duced the in stru ment of short
ma tu rity repo collateralised by gov ern ment se cu ri ties. The op er a  -
tions were tech ni cally pro cessed by the New York FED.
“open repos” These very early forms of repo agree ments were quite sim ple;
they had two spe cial at trib utes. First, it was the re spon si bil ity of the
cen tral bank ei ther to col lect the in ter est pay ment and credit the ac  -
count of the coun ter part or to pass the in ter est cou pon of the col lat  -
eral credit in stru ment to the bank. Sec ond, these repo trans ac tions
were so called “open repos”, thus the Fed had the right to re verse
them any time be fore ma tu rity.
How ever, it was not clear whether the FED had the right to
make such trans ac tions with a bank not par tic i pat ing in the sys tem.
A 1925 amend ment of the Fed eral Re serve Act clar i fied the pic ture,
en ti tling the FED to make credit con tracts with banks from out side
the sys tem.
Amer i can cor po ra tions used to place their tem po rarily un nec  -
es sary li quid ity mainly in T-Bills. But as repo spread and be came a
more liq uid in stru ment, cor po ra tions could tar get an even better or
ex actly match ing ma tu rity for their in vested ex cess money. So, to  -
gether with the FED, these cor po ra tions fre quently as sisted the repo
deal ers to pos sess the nec es sary repo credit.
Dur ing the 1930s, be cause of the global fi nan cial cri ses (even
though the FED and the cor po ra tions sup plied suf fi cient repo deals)
the de mand for repo trans ac tions sharply de clined, since the fall of
trade in volved the fall of the BA mar ket. At that time, bud get fi nanc  -
ing was not as weighty a ques tion as it be came dur ing World War
Two. Thus dur ing that de cade repo trans ac tions grad u ally ceased.
re in tro duc tion af ter
the Sec ond World
War was done for
mon e tary pol icy 
rea sons
The re in tro duc tion of repo by the FED af ter the Sec ond World
War was not de signed to as sist trade or back the do mes tic money
mar ket, but was done for mon e tary pol icy rea sons.
    The mon e tary au thor ity is able to bal ance the li quid ity and the
daily level of the re serves of the fi nan cial sys tem by gov ern ment
bond out right sales and pur chases, or by repo and re verse repo. First 
the FED sold repo at fixed rates, then it changed to ten ders. In the
USA repo is the most ac cepted of the fine tun ing in stru ments. 
The repo has sev eral ad van tages. It is not very op ti mal for
mon e tary pol icy to change the ma tu rity of a main in stru ment too fre  -
quently and us ing out right sales or pur chases the op er a tion could
hap pen only with the ma tu rity of the back ground se cu rity. It is not
easy to deal with large turn over and big vol umes of se cu ri ties in an
out right trans ac tion. 
Prep a ra tion for cen tral bank in ter ven tion can be faster us ing
repo. On the prompt gov ern ment bond mar ket the cen tral bank in  -
ter ven tions can dis turb the ha bit ual re ac tions of in ves tors (even if
the in ter ven tions are dif fer ent in di rec tion and the vol ume is large).
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eral pa per.
re verse repo trans ac -
tions of the FED
be gun in 1960
The first re verse repo trans ac tion of the FED took place in
1960, when a huge ex cess li quid ity of the bank ing sys tem was fore  -
cast.
   The first re verse repo trans ac tion of the FED could be traced back to the fol low ing
rea sons. The cen tral bank was aware that a forth com ing air line work ers’ strike could
cause trou ble in the USA. The strike could re sult in a sharp rise in ex cess re serves of
banks, since cheques could not be de liv ered to their tar get des ti na tions and so the set -
tle ment pro cess could not start. The FED was con sid er ing how to stir tem po rarily the
too high ex cess li quid ity of the mar ket. At the time the FED was cau tious about call ing 
the trans ac tion a “credit given to the cen tral bank”, so “Matched Sale-Purchase trans -
ac tion” (MSP) was given as a name for the trans ac tion. This was fi nan cially ex actly
the same as a re verse repo, but in the books it was kept as an out right sale. 
The repo trans ac tions among mar ket par tic i pants started to
spread in 1950. In the very be gin ning of the repo mar ket his tory the
port fo lio man ager of Gen eral Mo tors could not in vest in a match ing
avail able ma tu rity T-Bill the money al lo cated to fi nance the div i dend
pay ment. So he agreed with a dis count house to pur chase some
gov ern ment pa pers slightly be low the mar ket price and later (on a
date agreed) sell them back. Since the trans ac tion seemed to be
ben e fi cial for both par ties, the repo in stru ment be came very pop u lar
in the USA.
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3.1.1 The market repo
The Bank of Eng land al ready ap plied repo twice a month from the
be gin ning of the 1990s. This was well be fore mar ket repo trans ac  -
tions were for ma lised (in 1994) and it be came pos si ble for of fi cial
gov ern ment bond deal ers to make such trans ac tions.
com plete
liberalisation on 
1 Jan u ary 1996
The com plete liberalisation of the Gilt repo on the money mar  -
ket took place on 1 Jan u ary 1996. Be fore that time se cu ri ties lend  -
ing was more wide spread. 
“Code of Best prac  -
tice”
The Brit ish Gilt repo mar ket were for ma lised on the ba sis of
PSA/ISMA, and since the Gilt mar ket had some spe cial char ac ter is  -
tics it was sup ple mented by an at tach ment. The Bank of Eng land
also is sued an at tach ment, called “Code of Best Prac tice”, and it reg  -
u lated the mar ket since the main rules were set out in this doc u ment.
The set tle ment of the Gilt repo is done by the Cen tral Gilt Of fice
(CGO) backed by the elec tronic ac count ing sys tem of the Bank of
Eng land. Be cause of the ad van tages of CGO mem ber ship with
tri-party repo and in ter na tional repo, some in sti tu tions ob tained
mem ber ship of the CGO, such as Cedel, Euroclear and the Bank of
New York.
The Bank of Eng land re duced the in ter est trans fer on the Gilt
from 37 to 7 days, pre cisely to as sist the de vel op ment of the repo
mar ket. Es sen tially this means that the buyer of the Gilt re ceives the
in ter est di rectly if he bought it at least seven days be fore the date of
in ter est pay ment. How ever within the 7-day pe riod the seller re  -
ceives the in ter est, even if he does not pos sess the se cu rity. Thus in a 
repo trans ac tion with an in ter est bear ing col lat eral the par ties have
to be aware of the in ter est pay ment tim ing and if nec es sary cal cu late 
the gap.
The in ter est rate of the spe cial in the UK is usu ally 5–10bp
lower than that of the gen eral repo.
In Great Brit ain the share of the spe cial repo is higher (around
65% of the to tal), than the gen eral repo (35%).
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The Bank of Eng land used the repo as a mon e tary pol icy in stru ment 
be fore the liberalisation of the Gilt repo mar ket. It ful filled the very
im por tant task of ad dress ing the need for li quid ity on the money
mar ket dur ing the ERM cri sis in 1992.
new tech niques for
smooth ing li quid ity
One of the 1997 re forms of the Bank of Eng land was the in tro  -
duc tion of new tech niques for smooth ing li quid ity on the money
mar ket. This was an im por tant step, since the BOE did not levy stat  -
u tory re serve on credit in sti tu tions with av er ag ing and so there was a 
need for an in stru ment to limit the fluc tu a tions of the short-term
mar ket rates. The lib eral ised and dy nam i cally de vel op ing repo be  -
came the pri mary in stru ment of li quid ity man age ment.
The one week li quid ity fore cast is im por tant for li quid ity man  -
age ment with the cen tral bank. To be able to fore cast the li quid ity
short age or the ex cess on the mar ket pre cisely the BOE re ceives in  -
for ma tion from the gov ern ment ad min is tra tion about the trans ac  -
tions of the bud get in the near fu ture, from the dif fer ent de part ments
of the Bank about Gilt trans ac tions, about the for eign ex change
man age ment, about the mon e tary ag gre gates and about the ma tu  -
rity dates and amounts of the mon e tary in stru ments. The BOE col  -
lects fur ther im por tant in for ma tion from the mar ket. Big banks no  -
tice if a cli ent is about to send a weighty and un fore seen amount to
the bud get. In the fore cast the BOE also takes into con sid er ation
week ends, na tional hol i days and sea sonal fac tors. The Bank pub  -
lishes the fore cast for the day at 09.45 through its elec tronic com  -
mu ni ca tion chan nels.
The cen tral bank repo in ter est rates are fixed, but can be
changed by the de ci sion of the Mon e tary Pol icy Com mit tee (MPC).
The repo is sold on fixed in ter est rate ten ders with a quan tity limit.
There are at least two repo ten ders a day; the ten der call con tains the 
amount of fered, the fixed in ter est rate and the ma tu rity.
Gen erally at the first daily auc tion 70% of the daily li quid ity
short age is of fered, and at the sec ond the re main ing 30%. It is also
pos si ble for banks to run into neg a tive bal ance with the BOE dur ing
the day, but they have to close with pos i tive bal ance. Some times
there are banks not able to ful fil the re quire ment of the pos i tive
end-day bal ance, be cause they could not al lo cate the ad e quate
amount. This can be traced back to two dif fer ent rea sons: the bank
mis matched the in-and-outflow or the BOE daily fore cast of li quid ity
short age proved too small. If af ter the daily nor mal auc tions a li quid  -
ity short age re mains on the mar ket an ex tra auc tion can be made
with a lim ited num ber of counterparties. If short age re mained be  -
cause of a mis taken fore cast, and it turns out till the call for the ex tra
auc tion the BOE does not ap ply higher rates (if it turns out later,
banks as sume the bur den of the higher in ter est rate). 
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BOE is about 71%, out right sales and pur chases take 23% and the
ex tra auc tion repo has a 7% stake.
3.2 Germany
3.2.1  Market repo
the Ger man repo
mar ket pri mar ily op -
er ated in Lon don
Un til 1997 the Ger man repo mar ket pri mar ily op er ated in Lon don.
The main rea son be hind this was that the Bundesbank re quired a 2% 
min i mum re serve re quire ment with out re mu ner a tion on ev ery kind
of de posit placed by cli ents with credit in sti tu tions. So it seemed
better for Ger man banks to trade repo in Lon don. This re sulted in a
larger Ger man se cu rity based de riv a tives mar ket in Lon don than in
the Ger man do mes tic mar ket.
At this time – when Lon don was the lead ing de riv a tives trade
cen tre for Ger man in stru ments – the tra di tion ally large mar ket of se  -
cu ri ties lend ing was spread, since it was not con sid ered to be de  -
posit. At that time the cen tral bank repo was al ready ap plied and
buy-and-sell-back was also avail able on the mar ket. Mar ket par tic i  -
pants us ing these in stru ments were mo ti vated more by ac cess to
some spe cial se cu rity, than by the need to cover li quid ity short ages
or re duce ex cess li quid ity.
the trans ac tion costs
of the repo were quite 
high and thus only
large vol ume  con  -
tracts could be prof it  -
able
The Bundesbank per ceived the prob lem and made a sur vey
about the prob a bil ity of loop holes ap pear ing in stat u tory re serve
reg u la tions should an ex cep tion be made for the repo trans ac tions.
The an a lysts said in the sur vey that in Ger many the trans ac tion costs 
of the repo were quite high and thus only large vol ume (whole sale)
con tracts could be prof it able, and that the ma jor ity of banks had
such large amount con tracts. It pre sumed a low prob a bil ity of loop  -
holes ap pear ing (which could hap pen if bank de pos i tors placed their 
cash in the form of repo in stead of de posit). In De cem ber 1996, tak  -
ing its sur vey into con sid er ation, the Bundesbank de cided to ex empt 
from stat u tory re serve re quire ment repo trans ac tions with col lat eral
quoted on the stock ex change and with ma tu rity shorter than one
year. The col lat eral can not be the is sue of a bank.
Af ter the ex emp tion came into force on 1 Jan u ary 1997 many
credit in sti tu tions moved their de riv a tives trade back to Ger many.
Ac cord ing to a Bundesbank sur vey, in March 1996 the to tal stock of
repo trans ac tions of the banks was DEM 8 bil lion; soon af ter the ex  -
emp tion it rose to DEM 14.4 bil lion; in De cem ber 1997 to DEM
48.3 bil lion and in Jan u ary 1998 to DEM 63 bil lion. The Bundesbank 
ex pects that the real amounts could be even higher.
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The Bundesbank ap plied re pur chas ing agree ment to in ter vene in
the money mar ket for the first time in April 1973. Since at the time
there was in suf fi cient le gal and tech ni cal in fra struc ture to ac cept
bonds as col lat eral, bills-of-exchange were used as back ground pa  -
per.
An im por tant mod i fi ca tion took place in 1979, when the cen tral 
bud get ran into con sid er able def i cit, in volv ing for eign-exchange out  -
flow. To en sure a sat is fac tory amount of cen tral bank money for the
bank ing sys tem, the Bundesbank in creased the dis count limit and
re duced the stat u tory re serve re quire ment. How ever, this seemed to
be ef fec tive only to a lim ited ex tent; fur ther more, the vol ume of
bills-of-exchange on the mar ket was very small. Thus (in May) the
Bundesbank in tro duced a new ac tiv ity, con tract ing re pur chase
agree ments collateralised by bonds. These trans ac tions were ap  -
plied only oc ca sion ally in the be gin ning.
reg u lar repo ten ders
from 1985
The Bundesbank made a fun da men tal change in 1985, when it
started to call for repo ten ders on a reg u lar ba sis. From 1985 to 1999 
the Bundesbank had repo ten der ev ery week for 14 days ma tu rity. 






























The total volume of business repo contracts and the number of banks
involved – in Germany
Source: BundesbankThe in sti tu tions un der the reg u la tion of stat u tory re serve re  -
quire ment were en ti tled to par tic i pate in the ten ders for repo. Set ting
the con di tions of cen tral bank repo, the Bundesbank was con cerned
the about num ber of counterparties be ing as high as pos si ble. Thus
there were around 3400 credit in sti tu tions en ti tled to par tic i pate in
the ten ders and 600–1000 of them were ef fec tive and reg u lar par tic i  -
pants, even though the pri mary Bund deal ers were not al lowed bid
di rectly at the ten ders.
Ac cord ing to the Bundesbank Act the Bundesrat was the main
de ci sion-making body de ter min ing the strat egy of the Bank and the
main prin ci ples con cern ing the credit and open mar ket op er a tions.
De fining the frame work of repo op er a tions ac tiv ity and the ma jor
mod i fi ca tions to it was also the pre rog a tive of the Bundesrat. This
body had a reg u lar meet ing once ev ery two weeks, so the frame work 
could not change be tween the two meet ings.
The an nounce ment of a repo ten der and the be gin ning of the
pro cess was the task of the Board of Di rec tors of the Bundesbank.
The Board sent a note to the Re gional Banks about the start of the
repo trans ac tion pro cess. It was very im por tant for the Board to have 
suf fi cient room for ma noeuvre when ever nec es sary on the money
mar ket, e.g. in the case of larger-than-normal for eign ex change in  -













The origin of the central bank money in Germany
Source: BundesbankThe func tion of the Bundesrat and the Board is di vided by the
prac tice of set ting the frame work and de fin ing the ex act con di tions.
The Bundesrat was re spon si ble for de cid ing the type of repo, the
dates of the auc tions, the tar get amount to sell, ma tu rity and, in the
case of fixed in ter est rate ten ders, the in ter est rate de sired.
Tech nically the part ners of the mar ket par tic i pants were di  -
rectly the re gional cen tral banks. This func tion in volved the task of
in form ing banks, re ceiv ing bids, chan nel ling them to the Board,
deb it ing or cred it ing the ac counts of the bank ac counts, and fur  -
ther more pledg ing of the col lat eral of the repo.
the col lat eral val u a  -
tion is con nected
with a “pool
sys tem”
The col lat eral val u a tion is con nected with a so-called “pool
sys tem”. This meant that each of the cli ents of the cen tral bank had
to keep an op er a tional safe cus tody ac count spe cif i cally for
Lombard (col lat eral) pur poses. The credit in sti tu tions could only
ap ply for a Lombard loan if there was a suf fi cient amount on the ac -
count as col lat eral. (At the end of 1997 the to tal amount of the pool
ac count was DEM 558 bil lion.)
The se cu ri ties el i gi ble for repo were bonds listed on the stock
ex change or on a con cen trated se cu rity mar ket, and bills is sued by
the fed eral gov ern ment or a fund of it or the pro vin cial gov ern -
ments. A bond is sued by a credit in sti tu tion that wants to sub mit it
for col lat eral is an ex cep tion.
The Bundesbank ap plied repo on fixed in ter est rate ten der or
fixed quan tity ten der (with min i mum in ter est rate de fined) us ing ei  -
ther the Dutch or Amer i can auc tion method. In 1997 the Bundes -
bank or gan ised 53 repo auc tions each in the form of in ter est rate
ten der. At the end of 1997 the amount of repo outstandings of the





The world’s sec ond larg est repo mar ket (af ter the USA) is the
French one. This no ta ble rank is reached be cause of the large do -
mes tic repo mar ket, since the Eu ro pean cen tre of in ter na tional
repo is Lon don. The as sis tance of the Banque de France to gether
with an ap pro pri ate le gal en vi ron ment largely en cour aged the de -
vel op ment of the repo money mar ket. The gen eral repo con tract,
which fixed the frame work of repo agree ment, the so-called “Pen -
sion Livrée Agree ment” (PLA) was the French equiv a lent of the
Brit ish PSA/ISMA, and it also helped the de vel op ment of the
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the repo in dus try was the es tab lish ment of a sys tem of mar ket mak  -
ers (Spécialises en Pen sion de Valeurs du Trésor – ‘SPVT’). This
grouped the 12 most ac tive gov ern ment bond deal ers in the repo
mar ket.
the op tion repo is a
wide spread in stru  -
ment
The op tion repo (vente á réméré) is a wide spread in stru ment of
the French repo mar ket. Its most im por tant at trib ute is that the for  -
ward leg of repo con tains an op tional re pur chase fa cil ity, and not an
ob li ga tion. Gen erally the shorter the ma tu rity the big ger the turn over 
in France, and the share of O/N repo is rel a tively high.
The TMP (Taux Moyen Pondéré) in dex was used ear lier in the
French repo mar ket as a bench mark for pric ing repo, the in dex be ing 
the weighted av er age of the O/N in ter est rates.  There were repos
with fixed ma tu rity in dexed di rectly to the TMP plus a spread. Thus
the repo rate came to light only af ter ma tu rity. How ever the Banque
de France, es tab lish ing the sys tem of mar ket mak ers and oblig ing
them to quote two-way prices for dif fer ent ma tu ri ties from T/N to 3
months, en cour aged the de vel op ment of the fixed term repo and re  -
duced the ap peal of the vari able rate repos.
3.3.2 Central bank repo
The bench mark in ter est rate of the Banque de France was the repo
rate be fore in te gra tion into the EMU. There were two auc tions a
week with one week ma tu rity. The in ter est rate move ment unit was
5bps. Be fore the euro was in tro duced the repo rate was grad u ally
re duced from 4.45% (be gin ning of 1996) to 3.10% (end of 1997).
The typ i cal amount sold at auc tions was be tween FRF 31 bil lion and 
FRF 62 bil lion.
3.4 Switzerland
the Swiss repo mar  -
ket has a very short
his tory
The Swiss repo mar ket has a very short his tory. The in tro duc tion of
repos was ini ti ated by the Na tional Bank of Swit zer land (NBS) with
its first repo deal on 20 April 1998. The new in stru ment made it pos  -
si ble for the NBS to widen the spec trum of its coun ter parts and to di  -
rectly re fi nance small and me dium sized banks. In or der to achieve
this lat ter goal, NBS set very low repo lim its: the least unit of a repo
deal was es tab lished at 1 mil lion Swiss francs.  
The vol ume of cen tral bank repos then in creased sig nif i cantly,
reach ing the usual 8–12 bil lion Swiss francs vol ume of re cent times
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cance of this in stru ment in the fu ture. 
the NBS cur rently
uses repos only for
ex pand ing li quid ity
Cen tral bank repos are sold ei ther at auc tions or in the form of
customised agree ments. Auc tions are not held ev ery day, only when
mon e tary con di tions make it nec es sary. The NBS cur rently uses
repos only for ex pand ing li quid ity. At the auc tions, which start at 9
am, banks can sub mit their of fers on the amount ac cord ing to the
pre-set in ter est rate and ma tu rity. Af ter the banks have sub mit ted
their of fers, the NBS de cides whether to fully or partly ac cept them,
or re ject them all. The re sults of the auc tions are not pub lished, for
the NBS does not con sider repo in ter est rates as its main in ter est
rates, due to the cur rently un der de vel oped Swiss repo mar ket. 
Dur ing the day, the NBS has the free dom to agree with its coun  -
ter parts in unique repo deals with any kind of ma tu rity and price.
These unique and customised repos are un der taken also only for
mon e tary pol icy pur poses. 
The NBS takes se cu ri ties as col lat eral for repos only if they
meet the fol low ing re quire ments: 
1. De nom i na tion and cou pon yields only in Swiss francs.
2. Se cu ri ties are traded on the stock mar ket or on a sig nif i cant
mar ket; set tle ment through SEGA or INTERSETTLE.
3. Only is sues ex ceed ing CHF 100 mil lion are ac cepted in or  -
der to as sure suf fi cient li quid ity.
4. Col lat erals can only be debt in stru ments.
5. Is suer of debt in stru ment can be:
– state,
– can tons,
– other debt ors guar an teed by the above men tioned,
– Swiss towns,
– Swiss cen tral of fice of mort gage bonds,
– for eign states (with ap pro pri ate S&P or Moody’s rat ing) or in  -
sti tu tions guar an teed by these,
– for eign banks (by rat ing).  
Repos are traded through the elec tronic trad ing sys tem of the
stock ex change. Elec tronic trad ing has two com po nents: the
off-market and the on-market sys tems. 
In the off-market sys tem, the bank wish ing to make a repo asks 
for other banks’ of fers, and chooses amongst them (or re jects them). 
The on-market sys tem is a stand ard ised repo trad ing frame work
with given ma tu ri ties and con tract sizes. The sys tem re ceives the
banks’ of fers and matches sup ply and de mand. 
one of the most so  -
phis ti cated set tle -
ment sys tems of the
world
The repo set tle ment sys tem de vel oped by the Swiss cen tral de  -
pos i tory and clear ing house (SEGA) is one of the most so phis ti cated 
set tle ment sys tems of the world, and is unique in the sense that af ter
the reali sa tion of the deal there is no need for any kind of man ual in  -
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col lat eral amongst the pa pers de pos ited in ad vance, makes daily
mark ing to mar ket, man ages sub sti tu tions, etc. Since Au gust 1998,
the SEGA set tle ment sys tem has had a fa cil ity for the set tle ment of
intra-day repos, which al lows deal ers to gain li quid ity for only a few
hours us ing repos. 
3.5 The United States of America
3.5.1 Market repo
the USA repo mar ket
is backed 
by the larg est gov ern  -
ment bond mar ket
Since the roots of the repo were in the USA and this repo mar ket is
backed by the larg est gov ern ment bond mar ket on earth, no won der 
that the most de vel oped, larg est and most liq uid repo mar ket has
evolved in the USA. The repo collateralised by US T-bonds is in
over whelm ing ma jor ity on the mar ket, but there is also a very liq uid
mar ket for other pa per collateralised (e.g. junk bond or mort gage)
repo.  The do mes tic mar ket de vel oped on the tra di tional form of
repo, but be cause of the ad van tages of the set tle ment, tri-party repo 
also spread wildly. The most typ i cal is the o/n ma tu rity, with set tle  -












Repo outstandings of US gov ern ment bond deal ers
Source: BundesbankThe FED pro moted the de vel op ment of the repo mar ket with a
mea sure that charged the banks for their intra-day neg a tive bal ance
at a rate of 1bp per hour. This was nec es sary be cause a num ber of
trad ers re paid the ma tur ing mar ket repo in the morn ing and bal  -
anced the cur rent ac count with a new repo con tract only at the end of 
the day. This mea sure of the FED en cour aged the de vel op ment of
the tri-party repo and the open repo, be cause these forms have a
smaller prob a bil ity of en cour ag ing a fall into intra-day neg a tive bal  -
ance, since call ing back a col lat eral is not as easy as per ma nently
re new ing it.
3.5.2 Central bank repo
the New York FED is
re spon si ble for the
cen tral bank’s open
mar ket op er a tions
The New York FED is re spon si ble for the cen tral bank’s open mar ket 
op er a tions in the United States. The cen tral bank repo and re verse
repo be long to these op er a tions.
The FED ex er cises in flu ence over the li quid ity of the bank ing
sys tem us ing US gov ern ment bond trans ac tions. There are a num  -
ber in stru ments for this pur pose and they can be grouped, as they
are for prompt or tem po rary in ter ven tions. The prompt gov ern ment
bond sales and pur chases are among the most im por tant tools. 
As a tem po rary (for ward) trans ac tion, the FED calls for repo or
re verse repo (Matched Sale-Purchase Agree ment, MSP) ten ders
from gov ern ment bond deal ers. The ma tu rity of the cen tral bank
repo is be tween 1 and 15 days.
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Ta ble 1
Types of central bank repo
Num ber of ten ders
By tenders Fixed






1994 44 22 26 54 0 5 151
1995 43 17 25 43 8 9 145
USD bil lion
By tenders Fixed






1994 175 82 105 113  0 13 488
1995 168 81 120  87 27 21 504Ap plying fixed ma tu rity repo the FED makes repo trans ac tions
with a dis creet, max i mum 15 days ma tu rity. The open repo of fers the 
pos si bil ity of mak ing the trans ac tion “ma tured” be fore the orig i nal
ma tu rity. 
The for eign or i gin repo is a form of FED trans ac tion com ing
from the pur chases (and keep ing for a pe riod) of US gov ern ment
bonds of for eign cen tral banks from the FED as part ners, and thus
some li quid ity could get into or leave the sys tem. As these trans ac  -
tions oc curs on a daily ba sis in both edges, its ef fect is ba si cally neu  -
tral. Some times there is a greater de vi a tion from the op ti mal level on
ei ther of the edges, thus the FED uses the for eign orig i nated repo in
the do mes tic mar ket to cor rect the im bal ance.
3.6 Japan
3.6.1 Market repo
the seller have to pay
tax on each sale
trans ac tion
De vel op ment of the Jap a nese repo was largely dis cour aged by reg  -
u la tions con cern ing trans ac tion tax on do mes tic gov ern ment se cu  -
ri ties. This means that the seller have to pay tax on each sale trans  -
ac tion. 
The large vol ume mar ket par tic i pants over came the dif fi cul ties
by mov ing their trade ac tiv i ties to off-shore en vi ron ments, where
reg is tra tion of the trade was not re quired. Set tle ment of trans ac tions







th of the given month, and this also re duces the pos si ble
oc ca sions for repo set tle ment.
To avoid the tax pay ment, se cu ri ties lend ing spread with out
col lat eral, but for a charge. This is called taishaku. In this case there
is no se cu rity sold, thus there is no rea son to im pose a tax on trans  -
fer. 
There is also room for the buy-and-sell-back (gensaki), but this 
is mo ti vated mainly by fi nanc ing need and not by the need to pos  -
sess a kind of pa per (not spe cial, but gen eral collareralisation is typ i  -
cal). Since the gensaki co mes un der the trans ac tion tax re quire  -
ment, the fi nanc ing costs are high.
In 1996 a re form of the Jap a nese money mar ket was ini ti ated,
and the repo mar ket was also con cerned. The mod i fi ca tions were
pro posed by the Bank of Ja pan. The new reg u la tions made it pos si  -
ble to trans fer a bond with out a change of own er ship. On this ba sis
the genkin tampo tsuki taishaku trans ac tion de vel oped.
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The Bank of Ja pan ap plied gensaki pri mar ily for li quid ity man age -
ment or fine tun ing pur poses. This in stru ment was in use un til the in  -
tro duc tion of the new reg u la tions, when the cen tral bank started to
ap ply the genkin tampo tsuki taishaku as a more flex i ble in stru  -
ment.
3.7 EMU
repos have spe cial
im por tance among
the mon e tary pol icy
in stru ments of the
ESCB
Repos have spe cial im por tance among the mon e tary pol icy in stru  -
ments of the ESCB (Eu ro pean Sys tem of Cen tral Banks). One of the 
most im por tant tools of the ESCB in volves open mar ket op er a tions,
which ba si cally con sist of re pur chase agree ments and collateralised 
loans (these are equal to hold-in-custody repos).  
The four main rea sons be hind ESCB repos are: 
1. reg u lar li quid ity-providing; 
2. lon ger-term li quid ity-providing; 
3. fine-tuning op er a tions; and 
4. struc tural op er a tions. 
The first two aims are ex e cuted only on the ba sis of repo ten  -
ders and the lat ter two are both on the ba sis of ten ders and out right
sales. The ma tu rity and fre quency of the ten ders in the four cases
might be dif fer ent. 
two cat e go ries of el i -
gi ble as sets: “Tier
one” and “Tier-two”
All ESCB credit op er a tions have to be based on ad e quate col  -
lat eral. The ESCB ac cepts a wide range of as sets un der ly ing its op er  -
a tions. A dis tinc tion is made be tween two cat e go ries of el i gi ble as  -
sets: “Tier one” and “Tier two”. Tier one con sists of mar ket able debt
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Ta ble 2
Attributes of the instruments on the Japanese repo market
Yen repo market Gensaki Taishaku Genkin tampo tsuki taishaku
Le gal re la tion Sale and pur chase Lending Lending
Col lat eral Cash Noth ing (or bonds) Cash
Trans fer fax Yes No No
Fi nance cost Very high 
(since the tax)
No fi nanc ing needs Rea son able
Mo ti va tion Fi nancing Cov er ing the sale Cov er ing the sale
or the fi nanc ing
Source : Nomura In ter na tionalin stru ments ful fill ing uni form Euro area-wide el i gi bil ity cri te ria spec i  -
fied by the ECB. Tier two con sists of ad di tional as sets, mar ket able
and non-marketable, which are of par tic u lar im por tance for na tional
fi nan cial mar kets and bank ing sys tems, and for which el i gi bil ity cri  -
te ria are es tab lished by the na tional cen tral banks, sub ject to the
ECB.  
Debt in stru ments are sub ject to spe cific ini tial mar gins and val  -
u a tion hair cuts es tab lished by ECB as a tool of risk con trol. Na tional
cen tral banks may re quire ad di tional mar gin ing and es tab lish part  -
ner lim its, etc. on Tier two pa pers. 
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Eu rope and in the US. In the fol low ing chap ters we dis cuss the do  -
mes tic repo mar kets, both from the point of view of cen tral bank
repos and repos of other mar ket par tic i pants (repos of the busi ness
sec tor). These two seg ments of the repo mar kets show dif fer ent
char ac ter is tics in many ways. 
4.1 Regulatory framework1
the no tion of re pur -
chase agree ment is
not de fined by ei ther
the Civil Code or
by Act 
The no tion of re pur chase agree ment as a sort of se cu ri ties trans ac  -
tion – or in other words, se cu ri ties sales agree ment with re pur chase
ob li ga tion – is not de fined by ei ther the Civil Code or by Act CXII of
1997 on Floa ta tion of Se cu ri ties, In vest ment Ser vices and the Stock 
Ex change (here in af ter: the Se cu ri ties Act). 
from a civil law ap  -
proach an atyp i cal
con tract 
From a civil law ap proach, re pur chase agree ment is an atyp i  -
cal con tract where counterparties agree to trans fer the own er ship of
se cu ri ties and, at the same time, they agree on the re pur chase price
as well as ev ery other con di tion of the sale. In terms of con trac tual
rights and du ties of the par ties, one may dis tin guish be tween sev eral
types of re pur chase agree ments. There are ba si cally two types of re  -
pur chase  agree ments ap plied in do mes tic prac tice: in case of de liv  -
ery re pur chase, the trans ac tion is de fined as a sale and re pur chase,
whereas with a hold-in-custody re pur chase agree ment se cu ri ties are 
con sid ered only as col lat eral se cur ing the deal. 
ac cord ing to the sys -
tem of the Se cu ri ties
Act are con sid ered as 
fu tures se cu ri ties con  -
tracts
Ac cord ing to the sys tem of the Se cu ri ties Act, re pur chase
agree ments are con sid ered as fu tures se cu ri ties con tracts (Sec tion
5 b.), even though the act does not pro vide a def i ni tion ei ther about
se cu ri ties for ward agree ments or about re pur chase agree ments and
re verse re pur chase agree ments. 
In the ef fec tive le gal norms and reg u la tions, re pur chase agree  -
ments are de fined in sec ond ary leg is la tion (mainly in ac count ing
rules), but not in a uni form way. 
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1
 The chap ter is writ ten with the as sis tance of Reg u la tory Debt.the spe cific re port ing
and ac count ing ob li  -
ga tions of the 
Na tional Bank of
Hun gary de fines re -
pur chase agree ment 
Gov ern ment De cree No. 18/1997 (II. 4.) on the spe cific re port  -
ing and ac count ing ob li ga tions of the Na tional Bank of Hun gary de  -
fines re pur chase agree ment in Sec tion 2 as fol lows: Un der the scope
of this de cree (that is, with re spect to the ac count ing rules con cern  -
ing the NBH)
– any agree ment is con sid ered as re pur chase agree ment pro  -
vided that, upon con clud ing the agree ment, one party trans  -
fers the own er ship of, or pos ses sion of, the se cu ri ties pro vid  -
ing a full state ment of guar an tees and li a bil i ties for a cer ti fied
amount of con sid er ation, and un der takes to re pur chase or
re take them in pos ses sion at an agreed time and un der spec i  -
fied con di tions;
– any re pur chase agree ment is con sid ered as a hold-in-
 custody re pur chase agree ment pro vided that the se cu ri ties
are held in cus tody as col lat eral on the seller’s ac count at the
ven dor’s dis posal dur ing the en tire time of the agree ment; 
– any re pur chase agree ment is con sid ered as de liv ery re pur  -
chase agree ment pro vided that the se cu ri ties are, upon fi nan  -
cial set tle ment, trans ferred from the seller’s ac count to the
ven dor’s ac count and the lat ter may, dur ing the en tire time of
the agree ment, dis pose of the se cu ri ties.
 a spe cific type of bor  -
row ing against se cu -
rity 
Gov ern ment De cree No. 198/1996 (XII. 22.) on the spe cific re -
port ing and ac count ing ob li ga tions of credit in sti tu tions de fines re  -
pur chase agree ments with re spect to credit in sti tu tions, as a spe cific
type of bor row ing against se cu rity as fol lows:
– Bor rowing against se cu rity (or, in the us age of the De cree,
“pen sion place ment” or “place ment agree ment”, which is the 
Hun gar ian ap pli ca tion of an older French ex pres sion) means
that a credit in sti tu tion, fi nan cial un der tak ing or cli ent (the
lender) trans fers as sets held in its books (e.g. a bill of ex  -
change, debts or se cu ri ties) to an other credit in sti tu tion, fi  -
nan cial un der tak ing or cli ent (the bor rower) un der an agree  -
ment to the ef fect that the same as sets should be retransfered 
to the lender at a later point at an agreed price (see be low a.
and b.):
  a) a gen u ine place ment agree ment is an agree ment
whereby the bor rower un der takes to re trans fer the as sets ei  -
ther at a spec i fied time or at a time to be spec i fied by him,
  b) a not-genuine place ment agree ment is an agree ment
whereby the bor rower is en ti tled to re trans fer the as sets at
sales price (or against a con sid er ation agreed in ad vance) at
a spec i fied time or at a time to be spec i fied by him, and the
bor rower un der takes to take them back. An agree ment
whereby lender and bor rower agree to re trans fer and re take
the as sets at the sales price or at an agreed price upon ful fil  -
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not-genuine place ment agree ment.
in vest ment firms
does not have any
spe cific ac count ing
pro vi sion with re  -
spect to re pur chase
agree ments
Gov ern ment De cree No. 197/1996 (XII. 22.) on the spe cific re  -
port ing and ac count ing ob li ga tions of in vest ment firms does not
con tain any spe cific pro vi sion with re spect to re pur chase agree  -
ments, nei ther does it re fer to any of the above le gal norms. 
4.1.1 Problems arising from the lack 
of sufficient regulation of repurchase agreements
Since re pur chase agree ments are not uni formly reg u lated, and
there is no gen er ally ac cepted def i ni tion of the no tion, this type of
trans ac tion is highly sus cep ti ble to le gal eva sion and thus the un  -
der min ing of the ef fi ciency of le gal reg u la tion. 
With re spect to for eign ex change law, as sess ment of the le gal
na ture of re pur chase agree ments var ies. Ac cord ing to one opin ion,
re pur chase agree ments fall into the cat e gory of ne go tia ble in vest  -
ment in stru ment as de fined in Sub-section 3. 28/b. of Act XCV of
1995 on for eign ex change, since
– it is a cer tif i cate is sued in re spect of a right or li a bil ity which is 
not con sid ered as se cu rity, nev er the less 
– it cer ti fies the re ceipt of an eq uity or a debt in stru ment, and
– it pro vides full right of dis posal un til ma tu rity.
The Act on For eign Ex change does not con sider short term
cap i tal move ments as lib eral ised, there fore it stip u lates that “a res i  -
dent may trans fer to a non-resident any 
– bond or other debt in stru ment or money mar ket in stru ment
which was is sued with a ma tu rity of less than 365 days,
– trans fer able in stru ments is sued by a res i dent” (Sub-sections
35.5. a–b) of the For eign Ex change Act).2
The cat e gory of trans fer able in stru ments in cludes, among oth ers:
– a cer tif i cate is sued in re spect of money claims,
– a cer tif i cate not qual i fy ing as se cu rity, cer ti fy ing the re ceipt of 
a debt in stru ment or se cu rity, or in di rectly al low ing right of
dis posal of such in stru ments,
– fu tures agree ments ef fected with money claims, ex change
rate and in ter est risk swap agree ments or any other de riv a  -
tive agree ment, re gard less of whether or not a doc u ment has
been is sued in re spect thereof (Sub-sections 3. 28. b–e) of
the For eign Ex change Act).
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2 The list is not com plete, it only con tains the pro vi sions bear ing rel e vance with re spect to this
pa per.Un der the For eign Ex change Act, re pur chase agree ments fall
un der dif fer ent con sid er ation if one re gards them as two sep a rate
prompt sale agree ments.
 For in this case the ob ject of these agree ments is re garded as
sale of a debt in stru ment with ma tu rity ex ceed ing 365 days and,
con se quently, these agree ments do not re quire any per mit. (Thus,
such agree ments are not le gally con sid ered as re pur chase agree  -
ments, there fore the re pur chase agree ment im plies high risk, be  -
cause it is not backed with col lat eral.) 
 the com bi na tion of a
prompt sale of se cu ri  -
ties... 
Should we con sider re pur chase agree ment as the com bi na tion
of a prompt sale of se cu ri ties and a for ward agree ment, we ar rive at
yet an other con clu sion un der the For eign Ex change Act, and in this
case, a per mit is re quired not only for the joint agree ment but also
sep a rately for the for ward part. 
...or a credit agree  -
ment
If we con sider re pur chase agree ment as a credit agree ment, its
sta tus un der for eign ex change law will be again dif fer ent, since re  -
pur chase or other agree ments must com ply with the def i ni tion
of credit as set forth in the For eign Ex change Act (Sub-section
3.30.d). 
Ac cord ing to Sub-section 3.30.d of the For eign Ex change Act,
credit shall mean:
a) money loan,
b) de ferred pay ment (com mer cial credit, credit against goods,
sup plier’s credit),
c) ad vance and in stal ment pay ment,
d) re pur chase agree ment not de fined in the above sub-sections 
where re pur chase is ef fected at a price (value) higher than the orig i  -
nal sales price (value); in de ter min ing whether or not the re pur chase
price is higher than the orig i nal price, all amounts paid with re spect
to re pur chase shall be taken into con sid er ation. 
these agree ments
might better be con -
sid ered as credit
agree ments...
Le gal un cer tainty with re spect to re pur chase agree ments is fur  -
ther in creased by the fact that these agree ments may be con sid ered
as credit agree ments from the view point of eco nom ics. Some of the
quoted le gal norms and reg u la tions con firm such qual i fi ca tion as
credit agree ments, for ex am ple the reg u la tion on place ment (“pen  -
sion”) agree ments in the Gov ern ment De cree on the ac count ing ob  -
li ga tions of credit in sti tu tions. The Gov ern ment De cree on the ac  -
count ing ob li ga tions of the NBH ex plic itly uses the ex pres sion
“grant ing credit” with re spect to hold-in-custody re pur chase agree  -
ments. 
...the le gal form is  se -
cu rity sales agree ment
Yet  (with some lim i ta tions on cer tain own er ship rights), more
ex actly the com bi na tion of a prompt and a for ward sales agree ment.
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make use of the in -
con sis ten cies of le gal
reg u la tion in or der to
avoid the re stric tions
im posed upon them
with a view to re duce 
risk and pro tect their
port fo lio
Sub-sections 9.3 and 9.4 of Act LXIII of 1991 on in vest ment
funds pro hibit fund man ag ers from pledg ing the cap i tal of the fund
un der their man age ment or from us ing it as col lat eral in any other
way, as well as from grant ing credit (lend ing) from the in vest ment
fund’s own funds (with the ex cep tion of pur chas ing debt in stru  -
ments). Sub-section 36.4 stip u lates that the de posit holder may not
give the se cu ri ties form ing part of the port fo lio of the in vest ment
fund into the pos ses sion of any body dur ing the en tire time of de posit, 
not even tem po rarily (with the ex cep tion of KELER, the Cen tral Se  -
cu ri ties Clear ing House). 
All the above pro vi sions, es pe cially those aim ing to avoid un  -
nec es sary risk ing of the own funds of the in vest ment fund (S. 9.3.
and 9.4.) may be cir cum vented by en ter ing into re pur chase agree  -
ments.
This dem on strates the high level of un cer tainty con cern ing le  -
gal reg u la tion on re pur chase agree ments such that sev eral ar ti cles
have been pub lished re cently by prac tis ing law yers draw ing the con  -
clu sion that it might well be pos si ble that a court would de clare the
va lid ity of re pur chase agree ments as nul li fied, based on gen eral
prin ci ples of civil law, since the sale of se cu ri ties with re pur chase ob  -
li ga tion is an agree ment hid ing a credit agree ment, thus it does not
in deed ex ist, does not have any le gal va lid ity, and one should in stead 
take into con sid er ation the agree ment hid den by the re pur chase
agree ment, that is the credit agree ment. The wide spread na ture of
this opin ion shows that do mes tic law firms as well as the le gal opin  -
ions pro vided by them to for eign in ves tors stand on an un cer tain ba  -
sis, and it is im pos si ble to pre dict what rul ing an in de pend ent court
would ar rive at, and what kind of ex per tise it could be based on.
Hence is nec es sary to cre ate un am big u ous reg u la tion with re spect
to for eign in vest ments, es pe cially if we in tend to im pose sanc tions
on those vi o lat ing the rules.
4.1.2 Regulation on repurchase agreement 
in the EC Directive on capital adequacy
Coun cil Di rec tive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the cap i tal ad e  -
quacy of in vest ment firms and credit in sti tu tions con tains the fol  -
low ing def i ni tion on re pur chase agree ments:
def i ni tion on re pur -
chase agree ments of
the EC...
“Ar ti cle 2.17.  re pur chase agree ment and  re verse re pur chase
agree ment shall mean any agree ment in which an in sti tu tion or its
counterparty trans fers se cu ri ties or guar an teed rights re lat ing to ti tle
to se cu ri ties where that guar an tee is is sued by a re cog nised ex change
which holds the rights to the se cu ri ties, and the agree ment does not
al low an in sti tu tion to trans fer or pledge a par tic u lar se cu rity to more
than one counterparty at one time, sub ject to a com mit ment to re pur  -
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spec i fied price on a fu ture date spec i fied by the trans feror, be ing a re -
pur chase agree ment for the in sti tu tion sell ing the se cu ri ties and a re -
verse re pur chase agree ment for the in sti tu tion buy ing them.
“A re verse re pur chase agree ment shall be con sid ered an
interprofessional agree ment when the counterparty is sub ject to pru  -
den tial co or di na tion at Com mu nity level or is a Zone A credit in sti tu  -
tion as de fined in Di rec tive 89/647/EEC or is a re cog nised third
coun try in vest ment firm, or when the agree ment is con cluded with a
clear ing house or ex change.
… and on the se cu ri  -
ties lend ing and se cu  -
ri ties bor row ing
18. Se cu ri ties lend ing and se cu ri ties bor row ing shall mean any
trans ac tion in which an in sti tu tion or its counterparty trans fers se cu  -
ri ties against ap pro pri ate col lat eral sub ject to a com mit ment that the 
bor rower will re turn equiv a lent se cu ri ties at some fu ture date or
when re quested to do so by the trans feror, be ing se cu ri ties lend ing
for the in sti tu tion trans fer ring the se cu ri ties and se cu ri ties bor row ing
for the in sti tu tion to which they are trans ferred. 
“Se cu ri ties bor row ing shall be con sid ered an interprofessional
trans ac tion when the counterparty is sub ject to pru den tial co or di na  -
tion at Com mu nity level or is a Zone A credit in sti tu tion as de fined in
Di rec tive 89/647/EEC or is a re cog nised third coun try in vest ment
firm or when the agree ment is con cluded with a clear ing house or ex  -
change.”
It should be noted that EC reg u la tion on cap i tal ad e quacy will
be ex tended to com mod i ties and gold trans ac tions as of June 2000,
and the def i ni tion of re pur chase agree ments will also be ex tended to
com mod i ties trans ac tions. 
4.2 Questions of accounting
all the trans ac tions
must be booked as
their real eco nomic
es sence
In in ter na tional com par i son sev eral coun tries do not spec ify spe cial
rules for repo ac count ing. How ever, ac cord ing to the in ter na tional
ac count ing prin ci ples, all the trans ac tions must be booked as their
real eco nomic es sence and not as their for mal in stru ments show. In
repo ac count ing this means that they can ap pear as a prompt sale
and a for ward pur chase, but if they are a collateralised loan in the
eco nomic sense, then they should be booked as a collateralised
loan.
EU Bank Ac count ing
Di rec tive
The EU Bank Ac count ing Di rec tives states that if the buyer is
not a holder of the col lat eral se cu rity (3-party repo, pledged repo)
un der the term of the repo, the prin ci ples are these: 
For the buyer :
– The col lat eral se cu rity is not in te grated into the bal ance
sheet.
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loan as set. Pos si bly with a head ing show ing that it is orig i  -
nated from repo trans ac tion.
For the seller:
– The se cu rity sold re mains a part of the seller’s bal ance sheet,
but it must be kept in a spe cial ac count with a no ti fi ca tion that 
it is un der repo trans ac tion.
– The cash re ceived for the col lat eral is booked on the li a bil ity
side, as in the case of re ceiv ing a loan. The pos si bil ity is also
given for the seller to sep a rate an ac count for loans re ceived
from the money mar ket and loans re ceived from repo.
in Hun gary, due to
the un der de vel oped
le gal en vi ron ment of
repo  there is
some con fu sion
In Hun gary, due to the un der de vel oped le gal en vi ron ment of
repo from the ac count ing point of view, there is some con fu sion. Nei  -
ther the Act on Ac coun tancy nor even the Act on Se cu ri ties men  -
tions repo trans ac tions. Thus, gen er ally, it is up to the par ties to de  -
cide whether they book it as a prompt sale and a for ward pur chase
(be low the bal ance sheet), or as lend ing. Both ap proaches dif fer
from the ba sic eco nomic mean ing of repo.
There is no un am big u ous and gen eral rule for repo ac count ing
in any other act. Thus there have been a num ber of ac count ing so lu  -
tions in prac tice. Some times se cu rity lend ing, some times two
sale-purchase trans ac tions in dif fer ent time and some times prompt
sale and for ward re pur chase is booked. 
the repo can  be
booked as se cu rity
lend ing
Whether the repo is booked as se cu rity lend ing, the seller does
not clear the col lat eral item from the bal ance sheet, but on the li a bil  -
ity side it re ceives loan (li a bil ity) that in ducts cash as as set. Repo be  -
tween banks (or credit in sti tu tions) and non-banks is un der the stat  -
u tory re serve re quire ment lev ied on banks if booked as se cu rity
lend ing, be cause there is a rise in the li a bil ity side of the bank (from
the non-banking sec tor). This reg u la tion dis cour ages the po ten tial
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Some spe cial cases of repo ac count ing
One of the most im por tant points of the PSA/ISMA agree ment con cerns
repo net ting. When two repo coun ter parts have a num ber of repo and re  -
verse repo con tracts and they can not de liver ei ther the se cu rity or the
cash, the op po site po si tions can be net ted. Ac count ing can not al ways
han dle this fi nan cially log i cal so lu tion. As there are dif fer ent ma tu ri ties
and dif fer ent collaterals, the prin ci ple of gross set tle ment is fre quently
used in such cases. How ever in some coun tries repo net ting of op po site
po si tions is also pos si ble on bal ance sheet (it is also fea si ble in GMRA).
Mainly in the USA the repo has a type, where the buyer gives back not the
orig i nal sort of se cu ri ties, but ones which have the same value as the orig  -
i nals. In this case the ac count ing is ba si cally the same as with repo net  -
ting. In this case the im por tant thing is the same, whether it is a loan or a
se cu rity sale and re pur chase.repo counterparties to book their agree ments (fi nan cially equal to
repo) as a se cu rity lend ing sort of repo. 
Book ing repo as se cu rity lend ing be tween two bank coun ter  -
parts is not dis ad van ta geous for ei ther of the par ties, since these are
in ter bank trans ac tions and so the com pul sory re serve does not ap  -
ply to them. Thus there is no rea son for not book ing repo be tween
banks as se cu rity lend ing short of repo, as op posed to, for ex am ple,
two prompt trans ac tions (some times this is not clearly un der stood
by credit in sti tu tions).
the other prac tice of
repo ac count ing is
the buy-and-sell-
 back sort of book ing
The other prac tice of repo ac count ing is the buy-and-sell-back
sort of book ing, when the gov ern ment bond is sold and it re duces the
size of the bal ance sheet. The o retically, af ter the first leg of the trans  -
ac tion the sec ond leg should be booked as a fu ture re spon si bil ity be  -
low the bal ance sheet. A less pru den tial bank could en gage in un law  -
ful prac tice when a fi nan cially repo trans ac tion with a ma tu rity of less
then one year is real ised with a non-resident. Such a bank faces se ri  -
ous sanc tions if the for ex ac tiv ity su per vi sors of the cen tral bank can
find the for ward leg of the trans ac tion in the books. Thus it can hap pen 
that the for ward leg of the repo trans ac tion is miss ing in the books un  -
til ma tu rity, and it is booked only at the date of ma tu rity as a prompt
pur chase. Thus the for ward leg of the repo could be found only with
the cer tif i cate of the trans ac tion. This cer tif i cate is usu ally  hid den
dur ing the end of the trans ac tion and called “drawer con tract”, since it
can not be found in the books, only in the draw ers.
dis ad van tages of BSB 
ac count ing for the
counterparties
The prac tice of book ing repo as two out right sales/pur chases
has a num ber of dis ad van tages for the counterparties.
– The profit ef fect of the repo ap pears not in the ad e quate profit 
cen tre of the com pany.
– It can re sult in some con fu sion – even loss – in the pro cess of
stock val u a tion.
– It can di vert the mar ket yield av er ages.
– It also can dis tort the sta tis tics.
In the fol low ing four chap ters (4.2.1 to 4.2.4) we ex am ine the
prob lems (in di cated above) if a fi nan cially repo trans ac tion is
booked as a prompt sale and later as a prompt re sale.
4.2.1 Effect of rearranging the gain in time and
among profit centres
can be con fus ing for
the profit-and-loss
state ment of the profit 
cen tres
Book ing the repo as a prompt sale (clear ing from the bal ance sheet) 
and later as a prompt re pur chase can di vert the date of the gain ap  -
pear ance and can be con fus ing for the profit-and-loss state ment of
the profit cen tres. 
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mar ket price re duced by the hair cut and the in ter est, thus loss ap  -
pears in the books. But at the re pur chase leg of the trans ac tion, the
seller buys it back at a price re duced by the hair cut, and this is
booked as a prompt sale on that price. 
At the first repo sale, (in most cases) gov ern ment pa per is sold
much be low the mar ket price – the dis count fac tor be ing the in ter est
and the hair cut. Thus if taken in an tic i pa tion that there is no mar ket
price fluc tu a tion of the pa per dur ing the ma tu rity, then the seller
bought the se cu ri ties at a higher (mar ket) price. The seller has to
book loss at the first leg of the repo orig i nat ing from the gap be tween
the ac qui si tion price and the repo sale.
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Ta ble 3
Accounting procedure of the repo booked as prompt sale-purchase
Seller of the paper Buyer of the paper
Be fore the trans ac tion Re ceives the pa per at mar ket
price. Book ing it at this price.
At the prompt leg of the trans  -
ac tion
Sells the se cu ri ties at a price re -
duced by hair cut and in ter est.
Books the loss.
Buys the se cu ri ties at a cheaper 
than mar ket price and places to 
the books at it.
At the for ward leg booked also
as prompt
Buys back the se cu ri ties at a
lower than mar ket price (by the
hair cut) and books it at this price 
as a new ac qui si tion. Com paring 
to the mar ket price ac qui si tions
the hair cut is a loss un til the pa  -
pers are sold.
Sells the pa pers cheaper then
the mar ket, but higher (by the
in ter est), then the price of ac  -
qui si tion. The in ter est gain ap -
pears in the se cu ri ties trade line 
and not on the credit fi nance
line.
Af ter the trans ac tion Sells the se cu ri ties at mar ket
price and books the hair cut as a
gain.
The re sult con cern ing the profit
and loss of the trans ac tion
The “eco nom i cally” credit in ter -
est cost re duces the profit of the
se cu ri ties trade. If the ac count -
ing day is dur ing the ma tu rity of
the trans ac tion, the over all
profitis smaller. It is also smaller
af ter the trans ac tion, but be fore
the out right sale of the pa per.
The in ter est re ceived in creases
the gains of the  se cu rity trade
in stead of the credit fi nanc ing.With the for ward leg (booked also as a prompt one) the se cu ri  -
ties are re pur chased also not at the mar ket value, but at a price mod  -
i fied by the hair cut on the OTC mar ket. The seller is in a dis ad van ta  -
geous sit u a tion again, since he bought back the pa pers be low the
mar ket price, but to re duce the ac coun tancy loss he suf fered at the
first repo leg (and get back the price of the hair cut), he has to sell the
pa per on the mar ket. 
the trea sury is not in  -
ter ested in such BSB
trans ac tions
At the end of the whole trans ac tion the seller in ef fect pays the
in ter est for the “credit”, which un for tu nately ap peared not on the
credit costs line of the in sti tu tion, but on the se cu ri ties trade line of
the profit-and-loss state ment, so re duc ing the gains of a the se cu ri  -
ties trade sec tion op er at ing also as a profit cen tre. That is why the
fixed in ter est bear ing in stru ments di vi sion of the trea sury is not in ter  -
ested in such trans ac tions, when there is a need to sat isfy fi nanc ing
re quire ments. 
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Ex am ple for the ac count ing of repo as two prompt sales
and pur chases
Here is an ex am ple to pres ent this sort of book ing. The seller gives the
buyer 100 unit value of gov ern ment bonds. Sup pose that the net value of
the se cu ri ties is fixed dur ing the trans ac tion. The 100 units must fit the
amount of the credit, the ac crued in ter est of the trans ac tion and the mar  -
gin. As suming that for the whole ma tu rity the in ter est is 8 units and the
mar gin is 2 units, the buyer re ceives the pa pers for 90 units. At this point
the ac coun tant places 10 units of loss with the seller, since the se cu ri ties
pur chased for 100 units are sold for only 90.
When the seller buys back the col lat eral, he has to pay 98 units for the se  -
cu ri ties val ued for 100 units in the money mar ket. Thus the ac coun tant
can show a 2-unit gain, but only later, when the se cu ri ties are sold on the
mar ket for 100 units. This gain ap pears later, but again on the se cu ri ties
trade profit line. The eco nomic con tent of the trans ac tion is closer to a
credit. The dif fer ence be tween the two prices – in this case 8 units –
equals the charge of the credit (the in ter est). And the in ter est ap pears not
in the ap pro pri ate line of the books.
In the case of the buyer the op po site hap pens. This case is more sim ple,
since the ac qui si tion of the se cu ri ties hap pens at the first leg of the repo at 
ac qui si tion price. At the for ward leg the gain ap pears im me di ately. From
that point, the gain of the credit ap pears im me di ately in the right time and 
the hair cut is only a neu tral tran sit stock, but the gain raises the value of
the se cu ri ties trade profit and not the credit fi nanc ing profit.4.2.2 The anomalies of stock valuation
the prob lems with
stock val u a tion
Here is an ex am ple to show the prob lems with stock val u a tion. On
Mon day a bro ker age firm buys 100 gov ern ment bonds at 100%
value. On Tues day it pledges 100 to be re leased on Fri day. On
Wednes day it buys 100 ad di tional ones for 110%. And on Thurs day
it sells 100. On Fri day the Tues day pledge is over.
The as sump tion is that the bro ker age firm uses the “First out”
method of stock val u a tion.
The ques tion is whether the se cu ri ties pledged as col lat eral are
out of the stock (typ i cally for a buy-and-sell-back or a de liv ery repo
they are out). If they are out, the se cu ri ties bought at 100% and
KELER ac cepted at 95% will be booked back at this value. If at the
same time of the pledge, the se cu ri ties are cleared from the stock, a
5% loss arises in the books, since the se cu ri ties bought at 100% are
booked back only at 95%, though fi nan cially there were no loss. To
solve the prob lem the se cu ri ties must be sold on the mar ket. 
Thus it is not rec om mended that the pledge be a stock trans ac  -
tion like buy ing or sell ing a se cu rity, rather it re quires a sep a ra tion of
the pledged stock un der the bal ance sheet or only a sep a ra tion in the 
anal y sis.
The sold se cu ri ties also have some prob lems aris ing from the
stock val u a tion. The sale of the 100 units is made by a “first out”
method from the 100% value pur chased pa per. In con trast the
pledge used the same 100% value se cu rity. The ac coun tant can de  -
cide – by “first out” – that the sale used the 110% value se cu ri ties, be  -
cause the 100% value stock is un der pledge, so it is im pos si ble to
move it. 
Ac cord ing to the choice of the ac coun tant, the cost of the se cu  -
ri ties sold can be 100% or 110%; the price is fixed, so it has an ef fect
on the profit-and-loss state ment.
A uni form so lu tion could be to ap ply “first out” the ory as the
pledged stock is al ways mov ing and formed from the re main ing (not
sold) part of the port fo lio. This is hardly fea si ble on the level of anal  -
y sis, when the pledged se cu ri ties are equipped and booked with a
se rial num ber.
4.2.3 The deterioration of market average yields
 dif fer ent val ues from
the mar ket price
Among out right bond sales there are some repo trans ac tions
booked as prompt sale-purchase. To make a repo syn thet i cally, the
price gap be tween the two pur chases has to be equal to the in ter est.
That is why the two legs of the trans ac tion can pres ent (some times
50 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
REPO MARKETSlargely) dif fer ent val ues from the mar ket price, de pend ing on the
ma tu rity, since the buyer re ceives an un der-valued col lat eral pa per.
The hair cut is also built into both trans ac tion legs and is also a
part of the se cu rity price. Com paring the two legs – un like the in ter  -
est pay ment – the hair cut is built into both, but to en sure the safety of 
the buyer the prices are shifted down from the mar ket val ues.
These ar ti fi cial mar ket val ues can in duce higher av er age yields
in a deep repo mar ket if the trans ac tions are ac counted as prompt
sales and pur chases, and the whole yield-curve can be shifted to  -
wards higher yields in place of the real ones.
4.2.4 Statistical problems
With out the ad e quate reg u la tion of repo and sim i lar in stru ments
prob lems can arise with ag gre gate bond sta tis tics. How ever, in Hun  -
gary there is no in flu en tial ef fect of the repo sta tis tics prob lems,
since the OTC sta tis tics show only a small gap be tween prices of the 
same se cu rity on the sec ond ary mar ket, but there should be prep a  -
ra tion against the po ten tial dan ger of this. Such mis takes can be
found with the prices of bonds and their vol ume. 
the sec ond ary mar  -
ket price of the repo
col lat eral can di vert
from the mar ket
price, as also the
yield in duce and re -
ported in the KELER
OTC sta tis tics
The sec ond ary mar ket price of the repo col lat eral can di vert
from the mar ket price, as also the yield in duced if booked as two
prompt trans ac tions and re ported in the KELER OTC sta tis tics (see
pre vi ous sec tion for de tails). One of the so lu tions could be if the size
of the repo trans ac tions could be sep a rated from the bond sales and
the repo in ter est and mar gin could be un cov ered. How ever, the main
ad van tage of this ac count ing is that there is not much pos si bil ity of
tell ing the dif fer ence be tween the real prompt sales and the legs of a
syn thetic repo. With out chang ing the reg u la tions there is no room to
fil ter the false data.
The vol ume sta tis tics can be dis torted if the two par ties of the
repo use dif fer ent ac count ing. Imag ine that the seller clears the se  -
cu rity from the books, but the buyer does not take it into the bal ance
sheet, so the se cu rity “dis ap pears” be tween the two in sti tu tions. In
an op po site case – when both of the par ties have the same se cu rity
in their bal ance sheet – the se cu rity is du pli cated.
the ac count ing of se -
cu ri ties lend ing is
also con tra dic tory
The ac count ing of se cu ri ties lend ing is also con tra dic tory. If
A lends B a se cu rity, then the se cu rity re mains in the bal ance sheet of 
A, as he is the owner of the se cu rity. But B has a right to sell the pa per 
to C, who will also be an owner. Fol low ing a boom in se cu ri ties lend  -
ing (un likely in the near fu ture), the num ber of se cu ri ties on the sec  -
ond ary mar ket could sta tis ti cally be greatly mul ti plied.
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4.3.1 Obstacles to the development
of repo markets 
repos in the busi ness
sec tor are much less
trans par ent than cen -
tral bank repos
Repos in the busi ness sec tor are much less trans par ent than cen tral
bank repos. Ac cord ing to the sta tis tics, mar ket par tic i pants in Hun  -
gary hardly do any repo deals with each other, buy/sell-backs are
much more com mon. This is due to many rea sons, but mainly to the 
reg u la tory re stric tions set by the Na tional Bank. 
the Act pro hib its for -
eign ers from un der  -
tak ing any kind of
fu tures or for ward de -
riv a tives with a ma  -
tu rity of less than one 
year
The Cur rency Act of 1995 pro hib its for eign ers from un der tak ing
any kind of fu tures or for ward de riv a tives with a ma tu rity of less than
one year. Be cause repos are usu ally short term (less than one year)
for ward deals, only do mes tic in ves tors can deal in them le gally, which
means that the po ten tial repo vol ume is only a frag ment of what it
could be with liberalisation. An other hin drance to the de vel op ment of
repo mar kets is that repos are sub ject to com pul sory re serve re quire  -
ment. This makes repos too ex pen sive for banks; it is worth while to
cre ate syn thetic repos by two si mul ta neous sale and pur chase agree  -
ments. If the two agree ments are signed on the same date, the deal is
a buy/sell-back, which is not a sub ject of re serve re quire ments,
though the eco nom ics of the deal is the same as with repo. 
 there is still an ob sta  -
cle for for eign ers cre -
at ing syn thetic repos
this way
Buy/sell-back pro vides a so lu tion for banks (who are less pru  -
dent in this re spect) to get round the com pul sory re serve re quire  -
ment, but since B/S is a for ward deal (if the term of the deal is lon ger
than 8 days) there is still an ob sta cle for for eign ers cre at ing syn thetic 
repos this way. Changing the date of the for ward leg agree ment to
the ma tu rity date of the B/S makes it ap pear as if the B/S would be
two in de pend ent spot pur chases – co in ci den tally with the same
amount and type of un der ly ing in stru ment and with the re verse di  -
rec tion. For eigners of ten use this kind of syn thetic repo in Hun gary,
rather than de pos it ing their money with the same con di tions with a
low-rated Hun gar ian bank, even if the trans ac tion costs of a bank de  -
posit would be lower. 
An other way of “con vert ing” for ward deals to spot deals is to in  -
volve a third party (not clear ing house) in the bi lat eral deals. In this
case the sell and re pur chase deals are car ried out with two dif fer ent
coun ter parts, who off set their po si tions af ter wards. It is very hard to
prove that these deals cover a syn thetic for ward agree ment. The dis  -
ad van tage of this kind of trans ac tion is that it in volves a dou ble part  -
ner risk com pared to a nor mal repo or buy/sell-back. Part ner risk
can be mini mised through clear ing houses, but this also in creases
the cost of the deal. 
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tween deals aim ing to get round the reg u la tions and deals car ried out 
for pure mar ket rea sons – hedged po si tions can look like B/S deals. 
in ter bank credit lim -
its also hin der the de  -
vel op ment of repo
mar kets
In ter bank credit lim its also hin der the de vel op ment of repo mar  -
kets. This prob lem still ex ists, though deals are usu ally set tled by DVP
– most of the banks do not take the (min i mal) risk of de fault. This
might also ex plain the fact that banks some times gain cash by ex pen  -
sive cen tral bank repos rather than by bor row ing (cheaper) from other 
banks. In ter bank credit lim its are set by the for eign head-offices of the
banks, and do mes tic branches usu ally can not in flu ence the ex tent of
these lim its. In the short run we can not ex pect prog ress in this re spect, 
be cause the re cent un cer tainty of in ter na tional fi nan cial mar kets has
a neg a tive ef fect on the tight ness of these lim its.
In ter bank lim its also mean that it is not cheaper for banks in
Hun gary to raise li quid ity through repos than through (not pledged)
in ter bank loans. This is be cause risk is not em bod ied in in ter est
rates, but in the low lim its set for each other. Repos are usu ally con  -
sid ered within the frame work of in ter bank lim its. This is ir ra tio nal,
be cause the two trans ac tions (repos and in ter bank loans) are very
dif fer ent in terms of risk. 
an other fac tor that
does not help to in  -
crease the vol ume 
of repos
An other fac tor that does not help to in crease the vol ume of repos 
is that banks of ten keep only as much gov ern ment pa per in their port  -
fo lio as nec es sary, so they of ten do not have suf fi cient pa per to repo
with. It is also a prob lem that when money mar ket li quid ity is not bal  -
anced, then most mar ket par tic i pants ei ther suf fer from ex cess li quid  -
ity or from lack of li quid ity, which means that the sup ply and de mand
for repos is not ap pear ing at the same time. Po ten tial losses de rived
from the book keep ing of repos and buy/sell-backs also make it less
worth while to carry out such op er a tions. The most fre quently used
book keep ing is the FIFO based reg is tra tion, which can cause
(non-real) losses for the com pany un der tak ing repo trans ac tions
(chap ter 4.2.2.), while this never oc curs with in ter bank loans. 
The rel a tively com pli cated set tle ment pro ce dure of repos is also
a prob lem for deal ers. Most banks’ in ter nal reg u la tions re quire writ ten
con tracts, and this in volves more ad min is tra tion for a repo than for a
sim ple loan agree ment. Ad min is tra tion could be highly re duced if
banks put the rules of repos in their gen eral con di tions of op er a tions
(like the NBH), or if they re fer to the rel e vant reg u la tions of KELER.
lib er a tion now is not
diserable from the
point of view of the
cen tral bank
Sum ma rising the above, syn thetic and spe cial kinds of repo are 
much more com mon in Hun gary than clas sic repos. This can be ex  -
plained above all by the strict reg u la tions. It is con ceiv able that if re  -
serve re quire ments for repos were aban doned and for eign ers al  -
lowed to par tic i pate in the Hun gar ian repo mar ket, the vol ume of
syn thetic repos and buy/sell-backs would de crease in fa vour of an
in crease in the amount of clas sic repos – though the ex tent of pos si  -
ble in crease is not easy to es ti mate. Banks would have the pos si bil ity 
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How ever, it is doubt ful that it would also be worth while to of fer such a 
fa cil ity for mi nor cli ents be cause of the high trans ac tion costs; they
would ba si cally con tinue this ac tiv ity with only those few part ners
with whom they al ready repo. Can celling the re serve re quire ment on
repos (while other li a bil i ties re main sub ject to re serve re quire ment)
would cause most of the banks’ li a bil i ties to be reg is tered as repos.
This would let banks avoid re serve re quire ments, which is ab so lutely 
not de sir able from the point of view of the cen tral bank. 
If the in come ef fect of the re serve re quire ment less ens, the
banks’ mo ti va tion to get round the reg u la tion will lose its im por tance.
The in come ef fect can lessen by de creas ing the re serve rate or by in  -
creas ing the re mu ner a tion on re serves. Holding back the costs of
steri li sa tion (up to a ra tio nal level) has higher pri or ity from the mon e  -
tary pol icy point of view than de vel op ing money mar ket in stru ments
(e.g. repos), so in creas ing the level of re mu ner a tion on re serves is not
a real choice for the cen tral bank in de vel op ing repo mar kets. The
grad ual low er ing of the re serve rate can be ex pected when the NBH
can per ma nently im ple ment high-end op er a tions, and that will be
pos si ble af ter the end of the cur rent steri li sa tion need. This would also
cut off the in come ef fect of the com pul sory reserves and would lead
to the de vel op ment of the Hun gar ian repo mar ket. 
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Pros and cons of ex empt ing repos from re serve re quire ment
Pros for ex empt ing repos from re serve re quire ments: 
  – Some banks get round the re serve re quire ments by hid ing large value 
de posit deals be hind buy/sell-backs. Re leasing repos as a sub ject of re  -
serve re quire ments would not only trans fer money to repos from de pos its, 
but also from out right sales and pur chases.
  – The lim ited amount of gov ern ment pa pers in banks’ port fo lios re  -
stricts the pos si bil ity of low er ing the ef fec tive re serve rate.
 Be cause of the rel a tively high face value of gov ern ment se cu ri ties and be  -
cause of the grow ing ad min is tra tion and trans ac tion costs, it would not be
prof it able for banks to con vert low value de pos its to repos. 
  – The sec ond leg of buy/sell-back agree ments is poorly doc u mented
by banks. Ex empting repos from re serve re quire ment would al low banks
to pro mote repo as a le gal al ter na tive to de pos its. 
Cons of ex empt ing repos from re serve re quire ments:
  –  Ex empting repos from re serve re quire ments would prob a bly make
banks con vert large value de pos its to repos, thus evad ing the ob li ga tion of 
com pul sory re serves
  – De posits for merly reg is tered as buy/sell-backs could le gally be pro  -
moted as repos by banks, and this would prob a bly cause the num ber of
repos to grow
  – Evading the re serve re quire ment could cause a de crease of ef fec tive
re serve rate. The long-term goal of the NBH is to de crease the ef fec tive re  -
serve rate by low er ing the nom i nal rate of re serves when it is pos si ble. Al lowing for eign ers ac cess to the short-term Hun gar ian for  -
ward mar ket would prob a bly make this mar ket seg ment more trans  -
par ent by re veal ing hid den repos. The ex tent of in crease in the vol  -
ume of repos (above the in crease caused by the con ver sion of hid  -
den repos) is very hard to es ti mate, but liberalisation would likely re  -
sult in a sig nif i cant growth in repo turn over. In or der to ful fil pru den  -
tial re quire ments, some for eign par tic i pants cur rently do not make
repo deals in Hun gary; these com pa nies would also step into the
repo mar ket given liberalisation. In the cur rent eco nomic sit u a tion,
ex cess cap i tal in flow can hin der or make the con duct of mon e tary
pol icy in ef fec tive. The re cent global eco nomic cri sis urges cen tral
banks of con verg ing coun tries to be more cau tious in tak ing fur ther
steps to wards liberalisation. It is not de sir able for the with drawal of
spec u la tive for eign cap i tal to cause wide spread and fun da men tally
un jus ti fied cap i tal move ments, which in turn could cause the loss of
con fi dence of for eign in ves tors for a lon ger term. Thus it is likely that
the liberalisation of for eign short term cap i tal in flow can not be im  -
ple mented in the forth com ing few years, but it has to be done just
prior to Hun gary’s EU mem ber ship at the lat est.
in or der to de velop
the do mes tic repo
mar ket, it would be
very use ful if mar ket
play ers learn the dif  -
fer ences be tween
repos and in ter bank
loans
In or der to de velop the do mes tic repo mar ket, it would be very
use ful if mar ket play ers learn the dif fer ences be tween repos and in  -
ter bank loans. In many cases they are not aware of their pos si bil i ties
or just sim ply do not feel fa mil iar with repos. Many still for get that in  -
ter bank repos are not sub ject to com pul sory re serve re quire ments.
Fears of po ten tial losses aris ing from ap ply ing FIFO set tle ment
should not be a prob lem ei ther; in case of hold-in-custody repos, the
pa pers re main in the seller’s prop erty so there is no chance of re val  -
u a tion losses. It is also not rea son able that repos are con sid ered to
fall within in ter bank loan lim its, since the two deals have dif fer ent
risk fac tors. We think that if these and other ba sic ques tions could be
clar i fied for all mar ket par tic i pants, the cur rently ‘stuck’ repo mar ket 
could take off. 
4.3.2 Characteristics of Hungarian market repos
repo mas ter agree -
ment
On the ini tia tive of ÁKK (Gov ern ment Debt Man age ment Agency) a
wide group of mar ket par tic i pants pre pared a repo mas ter agree  -
ment, which was based on the PSA/ISMA agree ment and
customised for the Hun gar ian mar ket. In prac tice, deal ers do not
use this mas ter agree ment, be cause it does not pro vide an an swer
to many unclarified le gal ques tions, and be cause, as men tioned
ear lier, repos are usu ally set tled as some other kind of deal in or der
to evade reg u la tions. Since the deals are not re corded in reg u lar
con tracts, they in volve very high risk. 
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ated by for eign spec  -
u la tors
Repos in Hun gary are dom i nantly cash-driven deals, the spec i  -
fi ca tions of the col lat eral be ing of sec ond ary im por tance. Most repos 
are ini ti ated by for eign spec u la tors hop ing to gain profit on ex change 
rate move ments, rather than ex pect ing in ter est rate gains. These
spec u la tive deals are car ried out in the form of repos be cause of the
low risk granted by the col lat eral. 
be sides spec u la tive
deals, banks use
repos for li quid ity
man age ment
The other rea son for hav ing mostly cash-driven repos in Hun  -
gary is that be sides spec u la tive deals, banks use repos for li quid ity
man age ment. Repos (or buy/sell-backs) are some times se cu  -
rity-driven, but this hap pens mostly when un usual mar ket con di tions 
oc cur. (The spring of 1997 is a good ex am ple, when, in con trast to
mar ket ex pec ta tions, the NBH in creased its de posit rates, and deal  -
ers, ex pect ing a quick re ad just ment of in ter est rates, sold large
amounts of gov ern ment pa pers in the form of repos. In this way they
were able to get rid of the pa pers which would tem po rarily cause
them losses. These repos were def i nitely se cu rity driven and were
not mo ti vated by the need for cash lend ing or bor row ing.) 
Most re cent sta tis tics of the NBH prove that repos are dealt
mostly be tween do mes tic and for eign deal ers, and that the reg u la  -
tions set by the NBH are eas ily evaded by deal ers. 
pop u lar ma tu rity In terms of ma tu rity, the most pop u lar con struc tion has been
the one-month repo. This is be cause banks can bor row money from
their part ners with one-month repo while in vest ing money in the
NBH’s one month de posit. This is a risk-free trans ac tion with se cure
yield. Ma tu rities be tween O/N and 30 days have also been pop u lar,
but there has been hardly any deal with ma tu rity lon ger than a
month. In many cases, orig i nal ma tu rity was ex tended by the coun  -
ter parts. Shortening of the ma tu rity of the NBH’s main in stru ment
from one month to two weeks in March will prob a bly in volve a re duc  -
tion in the du ra tion of busi ness repos. 
4.3.3 Collateral management
prim i tive col lat eral
man age ment
Prim i tive col lat eral man age ment ap plied to repos in Hun gary in  -
creases the ef fec tive ness of repo mar kets. Col lat eral is only eval u  -
ated at the be gin ning of the deal, and the ex tent of hair cut de pends
on the de mand and sup ply side of the repo: the party who has more
in ter est in mak ing the deal is usu ally the one who is will ing to give a
better price. Mark ing to mar ket is very rarely used, and this in  -
creases the risk of repos. The set tle ment sys tem of KELER is not yet 
ready for ad di tional mar gin ing, so in the case of daily eval u a tion,
mark ing to mar ket could be im ple mented by clos ing the orig i nal
deal and open ing a new repo. Lack of daily mark ing to mar ket and
us ing debt con sol i da tion gov ern ment bonds as col lat eral means
that repos usu ally in volve high hair cuts. 
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have a dual func tion
in re la tion to the repo 
The cen tral banks have a dual func tion in re la tion to the repo in stru  -
ment. Both func tions are con nected to dif fer ent subperiods of the
mon e tary trans mis sion mech a nism. On the one hand there is a sig  -
nif i cant func tion at the be gin ning of the trans mis sion mech a nism
when the repo is ap plied as a main in stru ment of mon e tary pol icy. In 
this case repo is a tool for the mon e tary au thor ity to reach its tar get
by im ply ing changes in the real econ omy through the trans mis sion
mech a nism. On the other hand repo can func tion as a feed back for
mon e tary pol icy at a later pe riod of the trans mis sion. It is also an in  -
stru ment for in ter est rate pol icy and li quid ity man age ment for the
banks.
The next part of the chap ter sum ma rises the dif fer ences and
ad van tages of the cen tral bank ing repo in com par i son with other
tools of the same func tions, and anal y ses which sort of repo is the
most op ti mal for cen tral bank ing pur poses. The fol low ing part gives
a short over view on the his tory of Hun gar ian repo mar kets. The third
part in ves ti gates the role of repo as a tool of cen tral bank ing op er a  -
tions, iden ti fy ing the func tions and the re lated Hun gar ian prac tice.
The fi nal sec tion briefly pres ents the im por tance of the de vel op ment
of mar ket repo from the cen tral bank ing point of view.
5.1 Place of repo within the instruments
of monetary policy
Repo was first ap plied by the USA mon e tary au thor ity and the prac  -
tice was later fol lowed by the Eu ro pean cen tral banks. Re cently a
large num ber of cen tral banks have used repo as their lead ing in  -
stru ment. Be cause of the very strong in no va tion of the repo and its
as so ci ate con struc tions, the repo mar ket is mush room ing. Repo
has spread not only in dif fer ent forms, but also the vol ume of fi nanc  -
ing with repo and the turn over of gov ern ment bonds and bills had
jumped up.
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5. | The repo from cen tral bank ing point  
| of view5.1.1 The advantages of repo over outright sale
the repo in her ited the 
pos i tive func tions of
the out right sale and
pur chase of gov ern  -
ment se cu ri ties
The repo in her ited the pos i tive func tions of the out right sale and
pur chase of gov ern ment se cu ri ties and in tro duced some new ones
when in te grated into the in stru ments of mon e tary pol icy. Using re  -
pur chase agree ments, the cen tral bank is able to in ter vene with
stand ing fa cil i ties, with auc tions, di rectly on the mar ket or in di rectly
by quo ta tion, sim i larly to the se cu rity prompt out right sale or pur  -
chase. Both of these in stru ments are use ful for an in ter ven tion to re  -
duce or in crease mon e tary ag gre gates on the mar ket, and thus
mar ket in ter est rates.
the pri mary ad van -
tage of the repo is to
be able to in flu ence
ef fec tively the op er a  -
tive in ter est rate
and/or the mon e tary
ag gre gate tar get of
the cen tral bank with 
a smooth, stan dard
and short ma tu rity
The pri mary ad van tage of the repo as a tool of the cen tral bank
is to be able to in flu ence ef fec tively the op er a tive in ter est rate and/or
the mon e tary ag gre gate tar get of the cen tral bank with a smooth,
stan dard and short ma tu rity. Ear lier, when the gov ern ment bond out  -
right sale and pur chase was in volved as the main in stru ment of the
cen tral bank, the mon e tary au thor ity could not avoid be ing tied to
the re main ing ma tu rity and the li quid ity of the bonds on the oc ca  -
sions of in ter ven ing. If the ad e quate amount of se cu rity was not
avail able or its re main ing ma tu rity was not ad e quate, the cen tral
bank had to de cide whether to in ter vene – pos si bly less ef fec tively –
with a lon ger ma tu rity, or try to use other in stru ments. Gov ern ment
bond sales and pur chases were not al ways well ad ver tised among
the wider pub lic, thus the ben e fi cial ef fects of trans par ency of the
cen tral bank and the suf fi cient pub lic ity were usu ally ab sent. Since
only a small seg ment of the mar ket was aware of the im por tance of
the in ter ven tion, the sig nal ling ef fect of the cen tral bank was less
pow er ful.
Repo trans ac tions are not de pend ent on the ex tent of the gov  -
ern ment bond mar ket and on the ma tu rity of the col lat eral se cu rity,
thus they are ca pa ble of al ways be ing used with fixed ma tu rity. The
fixed ma tu rity means that cen tral bank in ter est rate changes are
more com pa ra ble and vis i ble. Repo can be ap plied as a stand ing fa  -
cil ity or as a fixed in ter est rate ten der (it is not eas ily fea si ble for out  -
right sales and pur chases be cause of the dif fer ent ma tu ri ties).
The risk of price vol a til ity un der taken by the cen tral bank is re  -
duced, since the in ter est rate of the fu ture “re pur chase” is fixed ear  -
lier. How ever, at the prompt in ter ven tion the cen tral bank is not in  -
sured against the risk of price vol a til ity un til the time of an in ter ven  -
tion on the in verted side. 
Ap plying as set side in stru ments, the repo is a well spread tool
of cen tral banks. There are ad van tages of the repo over not only the
prompt pur chase, but also over the Lombard loan too (even if
Lombard falls in the same cat e gory as repo in some as pects). Ap  -
plying mark ing to mar ket is not typ i cal (al beit pos si ble) for Lombard
loan, thus the col lat eral value is less for the trans ac tion, since mark  -
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van ta geous be cause col lat eral sub sti tu tion is a gen eral prac tice,
thus the cen tral bank is al ways cov ered against a price fall of the col  -
lat eral, and the part ner bank is not lim ited to de cid ing any time
which part of his port fo lio can be used for the trans ac tions.
1
The ad van tages of repo de scribed above are ef fec tive only with
a lon ger ma tu rity, since on O/N (or a cou ple of days) ma tu rity there
is no pos si bil ity or eco nomic ra tio nal ity to ap ply mark ing to mar ket
or col lat eral sub sti tu tion. (There can be cases in a very liq uid mar ket 
us ing real time set tle ment where it is ap pro pri ate to ap ply intra-day
val u a tions or col lat eral sub sti tu tion).
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Ta ble  5
Comparison of reverse repo and similar instruments of central banks
Liability side intervention Reverse repo Outright sale Deposit
Po ten tial for auc tion 
sale + + +
Po ten tial for stand ing
fa cil ity
As long as the gov.
bond port fo lio lasts
As long as the gov. 
port fo lio lasts +
Trans fer abil ity (in di rectly) + (di rectly)
Mark ing to mar ket + – –
Ma tu rities are open 
to de ci sion + – +
1 In cen tral bank ing prac tice some times there are sim i lar in stru ments used in par al lel. Ear lier,
Lombard loans were used on O/N ma tu rity and repo on the two-week ma tu rity in Ger many.
Ta ble 4
Comparison of repo and similar instruments of central banks
Asset side operation Repo Outright purchase Lombard loan
Compability 
for auc tion sale + + +
Compability 
for stand ing fa cil ity + + +
Marked to 
mar ket + –
+
(not typ i cal)
Col lat eral re place ment 
fa cil ity
+
(pos si ble) –
+
(pos si ble)
Ma tu rities can be
definied + – +
In di rect 
trans fer abil ity + –
+
(pos si ble)Among the li a bil ity side op er a tions, the re verse repo can be
well sub sti tuted by de posit since their mon e tary ef fects are the
same. The only eco nomic dif fer ence in their mar ket roles can be
found if the com par i son is be tween the de liv ery repo and ei ther the
pledged or the de posit one.
ef fec tively there is no
dif fer ence be tween
the mar ket per for  -
mance of the pledged 
cen tral bank ing re -
verse repo
and the de posit
Ef fec tively there is no dif fer ence be tween the mar ket per for  -
mance of the pledged cen tral bank ing re verse repo and the de posit.
The for mal dif fer ence is that to wards the end of the trans ac tion the
cen tral bank (or a cus to dian) keeps an ad e quate amount of se cu rity
in cus tody as col lat eral for the part ner in sti tu tion, even though nei  -
ther of the par ties can use it for any thing. The part ner bank could ob  -
tain the col lat eral only if the cen tral bank would not be able to re pay
the cash at the for ward leg, but in prac tice this is im pos si ble.
In their for mal at trib utes there are very few dif fer ences be tween
the pledged cen tral bank ing re verse repo and the de posit. As re gards 
steri li sa tion pur poses or the po ten tial for ap ply ing them as stand ing
fa cil i ties, the dif fer ence is that the pledged re verse repo can be used
only as long as the gov ern ment bond stock of the cen tral bank lasts,
while the de posit is un lim ited in this re spect.
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Ta ble 6





Trans fer abil ity – The col lat eral is
trans fer able dur  -
ing the ma tu rity
–
Po ten tial for
stand ing fa cil ity
As long as the
port fo lio of the
cen tral bank lasts
As long as the
port fo lio of the
cen tral bank lasts
Un lim ited
Same con di tions
for each part ner Yes Hardly fea si ble Yes
Po ten tial for steri  -
li sa tion
As long as the
port fo lio of the
cen tral bank lasts
As long as the
port fo lio of the
cen tral bank lasts +
Po ten tial for fine
tun ing + + +
En cour ages the
de vel op ment of
the money mar ket + + +
En cour ages the
de vel op ment of
the gov. bond
mar ket – + +5.1.2 Delivery and pledged repo among 
the instruments of the central bank
fi nan cially there is no 
con sid er able dif fer  -
ence be tween the de  -
liv ery and pledged
repo in stru ments 
Fi nan cially there is no con sid er able dif fer ence be tween the de liv ery
and pledged repo in stru ments on the as set side ac tiv i ties of the cen  -
tral bank, since the cen tral bank does not want to use the gov ern  -
ment se cu ri ties dur ing the repo there is no sense in keep ing the pa  -
pers. Pledging the col lat eral is eas ier. 
the de liv ery repo is fi  -
nan cially more di ver  -
gent from the de posit
or the pledged repo
As men tioned above, if there is trust in a cen tral bank it does
not make much dif fer ence whether it ap plies re verse repo or de posit
– given the same con di tions. How ever, the de liv ery repo is fi nan cially 
more di ver gent from the de posit or the pledged repo. Run ning a de  -
liv ery repo, mar ket par tic i pants get not only the le gal own er ship, but 
also the pos ses sion of the col lat eral, thus they can sell it, lend it or
use it as col lat eral for an other trans ac tion. Given this po ten tial to use
the col lat eral, the de liv ery repo must have some li quid ity pre mium
over the de posit. So the cen tral bank could reach the same bank ing
sys tem li quid ity tar get with lower in ter est rates ap plied to de liv ery
repo. In any case, the ex ter nal con di tion for ap ply ing re verse de liv  -
ery repo is a very liq uid gov ern ment bond mar ket. 
the pos si bil ity of ap -
ply ing re verse de liv -
ery repo is very
re stricted
The pos si bil ity of ap ply ing re verse de liv ery repo is very re  -
stricted, since the amount of se cu ri ties el i gi ble for re verse repo in the 
trea sury of the cen tral bank is lim ited (this prob lem is solved if the
cen tral bank is able to is sue se cu rity and use it as col lat eral – see
later in the chap ter). Fur ther more, ap ply ing re verse de liv ery repo is
im pos si ble, since to be more ef fec tive on the mar ket and en joy the
ad van tages of this tool over the de posit (and set lower in ter est rates)
the cen tral bank has to pos sess huge amounts of gov ern ment se cu ri  -
ties in de mand. If a cen tral bank does not con sider the types of gov  -
ern ment bond a counterparty gets, and each counterparty could get
dif fer ent sorts of pa pers in a re verse de liv ery repo, this would lead to
sev eral prob lems. How could the cen tral bank de cide which
counterparty re ceives which se cu rity? If one counterparty ob tains a
more use ful col lat eral pa per than an other for the same “price”, it
could dam age the neu tral po si tion of the cen tral bank.
This pro cess could be sim i lar in some ways to gam bling, be  -
cause at the time a counterparty ap plies for the re verse de liv ery repo,
he is not aware of the type of col lat eral se cu rity he would pos sess.
a vi a ble in stru ment
for fine tun ing pur  -
poses
Over all, the re verse de liv ery repo can be a vi a ble in stru ment of 
the cen tral bank for fine tun ing pur poses. The most ef fec tive way to
use re verse de liv ery repo in volves the lim ited amount fixed in ter est
rate ten der. Thus, se lect ing the type of se cu rity to use as col lat eral
the cen tral bank can avoid run ning out of its stock of gov ern ment
pa per. Of course, the amount of of fer can not ex ceed the amount of
stock of the spec i fied se cu rity in the cen tral bank port fo lio. The re  -
verse de liv ery repo can only be used for fine tun ing, since the cen tral
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be ef fi ciently be used for other then fine tun ing pur poses (steri li sa  -
tion, cre at ing struc tural li quid ity short age). 
NBH-bill col lat eral be -
hind the re verse de -
liv ery repo
In 1997, when the is sue of NBH bills was on the plan ning ta ble,
one of the ideas was to is sue bills with ma tu rity lon ger than one year
and use them as col lat eral in one-year re verse de liv ery repo trans ac  -
tions, thus the bills could be trans ferred in the money mar ket.
One of the ben e fits of this method could have been to in ter vene per  -
ma nently  with  one  year  and  not be tween 10 and 12 months. Of
course this method is fea si ble with a shorter repo ma tu rity, e.g. a
6-month NBH bill can be the col lat eral be hind a 2-week re verse de  -
liv ery repo.
Ap plying de liv ery repo with the method de scribed above im  -
plies elim i nat ing the prob lem aris ing from the re stricted amount of
gov ern ment bond stock in the port fo lio of a cen tral bank, and in ad  -
di tion the de liv ery re verse repo can be used not only for fine tun ing
pur poses.
5.1.3 Collateral valuation 
for central banking repo
As was the prac tice for mar ket repo, the cen tral bank val ued col lat  -
eral for repo in a very el e men tary way up to the end of 1998. The
cen tral bank con sid ered the mar ket value plus a hair cut as ad e  -
quate for col lat eral sub mit ted for repo, and dur ing the ma tu rity there 
was no mark ing to mar ket. For tu nately, there was no need for mark  -
ing to mar ket, since the stock of repo was gen er ally low, the ma tu ri  -
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Ta ble 7
Possible roles of the repo applied by the NBH
Repo Reverse repo
Pledged repo This is the ac tual prac tice No rea son to use, since the
de posit is a per fect sub sti -
tute. (Ap plied by the NBH 
to Oc to ber 1997)
De liv ery repo There could have been some
rea son to use this if the cen  -
tral bank could (and would)
use the col lat eral dur ing ma  -
tu rity.
This could have an im por tant 
role in de vel op ing the money 
mar ket. Given the small size
of the NBH, the use of it is
lim ited. Fea si ble with BNH
bond use as col lat eral.ties very short and hair cut dis count proved ad e quate to cover value
losses of the col lat eral se cu rity. 
new method from
1 Feb ru ary 1999
At the end of 1998 changes with the as set side in stru ments
were im ple mented, and de vel op ing a re li able and trans par ent val u a  -
tion method be came nec es sary. In De cem ber 1998 the Mon e tary
Pol icy Com mit tee of the NBH de cided to im ple ment a new method
from 1 Feb ru ary 1999 and to value col lat eral in the same, trans par  -
ent man ner for all the as set side op er a tions. The hair cut dis count ap  -
plied for col lat eral de pends on the ma tu rity; and there are two cat e  -
go ries for the O/N and for lon ger ma tu ri ties.
daily mark ing to mar  -
ket tar get for col lat  -
eral val u a tion
The lon ger run tar get for col lat eral val u a tion is to change to
daily mark ing to mar ket, but to day this is re stricted by the in fra struc  -
ture of the NBH and also of KELER (set tle ment house). The sys tem
of daily col lat eral val u a tion is the most ef fec tive and mod ern sys tem, 
which en sures the au to matic daily mon i tor ing and ad just ment of the
value of col lat eral and the trans ac tion, se cu rity sub sti tu tion and col  -
lat eral pool man age ment. Col lat eral pool man age ment means that
the part ner in sti tu tion does not need to sat isfy the col lat eral needs for 
each trans ac tion one-by-one if over- or un der-collateralised, but for
all. 
At the end of 1998 the NBH ac cepted a pro posal for KELER to
ini ti ate the de vel op ment of a daily col lat eral val u a tion sys tem. These 
de vel op ments are en cour ag ing not only the smooth op er a tion of
cen tral bank ing repo, but also the better val u a tion and the col lat eral
sub sti tu tion of busi ness repo. Hope fully, the de vel op ment of NBH
col lat eral val u a tion will help busi ness sec tor repo too, since
re-evaluating the col lat eral on a daily ba sis will lead to smaller hair  -
cut re quire ments (less col lat eral for the same trans ac tion), and to
the low est risk of un der-collateralisation.
5.2 The history of central banking repo 
in Hungary
repo was ap plied for
the first time in 1993
In Hun gary the in stru ment called repo was ap plied for the first time
in 1993. A pre req ui site for repo in tro duc tion was a rel a tively well
de vel oped gov ern ment se cu ri ties mar ket. On the ba sis of a dy nam i  -
cally de vel op ing gov ern ment se cu ri ties mar ket the NBH changed its 
tools of op er a tions from di rect re fi nanc ing (as sisted by in ter bank
loans) to for ward gov ern ment bond re pur chase trans ac tions. 
quan tity limit set for
each bank
The cen tral bank in tro duced re verse repo as a stand ing fa cil ity,
mean while repo was ap plied with a quan tity limit set for each bank.
The NBH fixed the in di vid ual limit on the ba sis of the size of a com  -
mer cial bank’s bal ance sheet. Ini tially the repo outstandings were
quite sub stan tial, since 
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be fore and dur ing bank con sol i da tion and
– the NBH grad u ally con tin ued the pro cess of chang ing from
cen tral bank bud get fi nanc ing to mar ket fi nanc ing, thus
some times there was a clear ar bi trage gap be tween the repo
and the T-Bill in ter est rates.
At that time the banks had to keep “li quid ity re serve” and the
most op ti mal in stru ment for this was gov ern ment se cu ri ties. This be  -
come an ob sta cle to the de vel op ment of a repo mar ket, since these
se cu ri ties were not avail able for any trans ac tions, thus not for repo.
This could be one of the rea sons why cur rency swaps (with the same
con di tions) be came in creas ingly pop u lar. 
the av er age ma tu rity
of repo in stru ments
were grad u ally short -
ened 
In Feb ru ary 1994 the cen tral bank ceased the two-week, the
six-month and the twelve-month repo fa cil ity and also the six and
the twelve-month re verse repo, and in tro duced the two-week repo
stand ing fa cil ity with fixed in ter est rate. In May a new tech nique of
repo sale was in tro duced; two-week re verse repo was auc tioned.
This tech nique was vi a ble un til June and the max i mum vol ume in  -
volved was Ft 14 bil lion, but from then on the bank ing sys tem li quid  -
ity be gan to shrink and in ter est rate ex pec ta tions rose.
On 5 Sep tem ber 1994 the NBH ceased the three-month repo
and re verse repo fa cil ity, and in De cem ber the one-month repo fi  -
nanc ing fa cil ity was also closed. Thus the lon ger ma tu rity in stru  -
ments were grad u ally run ning out and they were only partly sub sti  -















Net outstending of repo,
reverse repo and shorter
deposit
Chart 4
The net repo po si tion of the NBHtuted by the shorter ma tu rity as set side op er a tions. In ad di tion, from
that time the set of ma tu ri ties of the mon e tary in stru ments of the
cen tral bank were en tirely dif fer ent from the ma tu ri ties of the in stru  -
ments for bud get def i cit fi nanc ing.
the o/n in ter est rate
cor ri dor took shape
From the third quar ter of 1995 the re verse repo outstandings of
the NBH started to in crease sharply and the po si tion of the bank ing
sys tem against the cen tral bank turned to the op po site, li a bil ity side.
From 5 Sep tem ber 1995 the o/n re verse repo was also ap plied, and
the o/n in ter est rate cor ri dor took shape. From Oc to ber the two-
 week re verse repo were ap plied as a stand ing fa cil ity in stead of auc  -
tion ing. 
the “repo gap” was
wid en ing
In May 1996 ceas ing the two-week re verse repo fa cil ity lim ited
the pos si bil i ties of the banks in terms of pledg ing ex cess li quid ity
with the NBH. The “repo gap” was wid en ing, since the o/n re verse in  -
ter est rates of the NBH were re duced by 4.5 per cent age points, while
the o/n repo in ter est rate was low ered only by 2.75 per cent age
points. The repo proved to be an ex cel lent in stru ment for steri lis ing
ex cess li quid ity aris ing from for eign cur rency in flow.
the cen tral bank sub  -
sti tuted the re verse
repo by the de posit
Dur ing 1997 the NBH faced a rap idly in creas ing amount of
steri li sa tion out stand ing, while the gov ern ment se cu ri ties avail able
to use as col lat eral in a re verse repo were lim ited. To avoid the prob  -
lem emerg ing from the short age of col lat eral se cu ri ties for repo, the
cen tral bank sub sti tuted the one-month re verse repo by one month
de posit. The de posit dif fered from the re verse only with one con di  -
tion, the NBH did not put col lat eral be hind the trans ac tion.
In 1998, in chang ing the gen eral con di tions for the in stru ments
of the cen tral bank, the repo and the de posit were also con cerned.
One-week repo ceased, and from the end of the year the sys tem of
repo lim its – un changed from 1995 – was re vised and made more
flex i ble. 
in 1999 repo and re -
verse repo
quicktenders be came 
a new avail able form
of in stru ment for the
cen tral bank
In 1999 there some mea sures were taken to mod ify repo con di  -
tions, mak ing the in stru ments more flex i ble. From 5 Jan u ary 1999
repo and re verse repo quicktenders be came a new avail able form of
in stru ment for the cen tral bank af ter the mod i fi ca tion of the “Gen eral
con di tions of the NBH money mar ket op er a tions”. Ap pli ca tion of re  -
verse repo is only a the o ret i cal pos si bil ity in the near fu ture, but in
the lon ger run it can be fea si ble. There was a pre ce dent in Jan u ary
for us ing repo quicktender (twice), af ter the op er a tions within the
limit proved too small for some banks, and they were not able to
man age their li quid ity. These repo quicktenders were fixed in ter est
rate ten ders with quan tity limit, but the “Gen eral con di tions” al low
the NBH to call for each ten der form (in ter est rate ten der, quan tity
ten der, un lim ited con di tion ten der) and the ma tu ri ties are also very
flex i ble.
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5.3.1 Controlling money supply by repo
The cen tral bank is ca pa ble of af fect ing the money in cir cu la tion by
many means. When the money mar ket or the bank ing sys tem is
short of li quid ity the repo is an ap pro pri ate tool for plac ing li quid ity.
And vice-versa, when there is ex cess li quid ity in the mar ket, cen tral
bank ing re verse repo is a suit able in stru ment to ab sorb the quan tity
of ac tual money.
Cen tral bank ing repo can be ap plied in sev eral ways to af fect
the mon e tary ag gre gates. The most wide spread ones are the auc  -
tions and the stand ing fa cil i ties. Auc tions with pre-fixed (of fered)
quan tity have nat u rally lim ited ef fect on the mon e tary ag gre gates.
But if the stand ing fa cil ity is used to con trol the amount of money on
the mar ket, it has to be com bined with a quan tity limit. 
open mar ket op er a -
tions and a strict
quan tity limit
In Hun gary open mar ket op er a tions were first in tro duced in
1993. From that time to 1995 the cen tral bank ing repo was very ef  -
fec tive, and it had a strict quan tity limit (changes of the repo limit
can be found in Ap pen dix No.1.). The NBH de vel oped its repo op er  -
a tions on the ba sis of di rect re fi nanc ing. Thus there were many ma  -
tu ri ties on the stand ing fa cil i ties, and a limit on the daily amount of
trans ac tions and later limit on the stock.
At that time the limit had a dou ble func tion. First, ac cord ing to
the func tion of “lender of last re sort” (see next point) it se lected the
trou bled banks which needed even more li quid ity from among the
repo part ners. Sec ond, from the mon e tary pol icy point of view it lim  -
ited the po ten tial amount of the cen tral bank ing money flow to the
mar ket.
In 1999, as the im por tance of li quid ity man age ment is grow ing, 
the effectivity of the limit is also more im por tant; how ever, the ben e  -
fits of main tain ing such a limit are doubt ful. With repo ten ders and
quicktenders the limit is al ready not used. The limit re fers only to the
o/n repo and swap.
5.3.2 “Lender of last resort” function
the ac cel er ated li  -
quid ity prob lems
would prob a bly en  -
dan ger the bank ing
or the set tle ment
sys tem
The cen tral bank ful fils the “Lender of last re sort” func tion if any
bank or credit in sti tu tion has a huge in di vid ual and tem po rary li  -
quid ity prob lem, which is im pos si ble to solve within the nor mal con  -
di tions of the bank ing in dus try and which, with out cen tral bank ing
in ter ven tion, the ac cel er ated li quid ity prob lems would prob a bly en  -
dan ger the bank ing or the set tle ment sys tem.
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of last re sort” func tion.  It could in volve an emer gency loan, par tial
or en tire ex emp tion from sat is fy ing the re serve re quire ment, or, as
the mild est so lu tion, repo within or over the limit.
tak ing ad van tage 
of the repo
Taking ad van tage of the repo can be done only with the ap pro  -
pri ate amount of col lat eral. Ear lier, sell ing a larger port fo lio on a
shal low gov ern ment bond mar ket could be dis ad van ta geous (re sult
in loss), or even im pos si ble in some cases, thus it was an eas ier so lu  -
tion to turn to the cen tral bank and ask for repo fi nance. How ever, the 
cen tral bank tried to avoid giv ing funds at close to the mar ket rate to
a bank ex pe ri enc ing a ma jor and not merely a tem po rary li quid ity
short age. That was one of the rea sons for in tro duc ing the emer gency 
repo over the repo limit. This is lim ited only by the gov ern ment se cu  -
rity stock of the bank, but its in ter est rate is es sen tially higher than
that for repo within the limit.
5.3.3 Repo as interest rate policy instrument
the cen tral bank can
also ap ply repo with
a fixed in ter est rate
term
The cen tral bank can also ap ply repo with a fixed in ter est rate term.
Usually this is the most in flu en tial (bench mark) in ter est rate for the
money mar ket, since part ners of the cen tral bank can al ways re  -
ceive short ma tu rity funds at this cost. Changing these repo rates is
also a very im por tant sig nal for the banks, since, if the op er a tions
are ef fec tive, it has an im por tant in flu ence on the whole money mar  -
ket. One of the main ben e fits of the cen tral bank ing repo is that the
cen tral bank can in duce a great ef fect with a rel a tively small ac tual
busi ness op er a tion – it can show the mar ket par tic i pants the ex  -
pected ideal level of in ter est rate. 
the repo can func tion
as the in stru ment for
the main rate of the
cen tral bank
In Hun gary the three months li a bil ity side in stru ment was as so  -
ci ated with the bench mark in ter est rate. Ap plying that in stru ment
the NBH was able to in flu ence most ef fec tively the ba sic unit of the
credit mar ket, the three-month credit. On the one hand, the cen tral
bank has to in flu ence ef fec tively the ba sic unit of credit pric ing – in
Hun gary the three months credit (since the fix ing pe riod for a flex i ble 
in ter est-bearing credit is three months). On the other hand, a cen tral
bank has to in ter vene on an ap pro pri ate and per ma nently de ter min  -
ing ma tu rity.
The larger, more open and more liq uid the money mar ket a
coun try pos sess, the shorter the ma tu rity with which a cen tral bank
is able to in flu ence ef fec tively the yield curve by em ploy ing de ter  -
mined in ter est rates. If a lon ger-term in stru ment has at trac tive (or
seem ingly at trac tive) con di tions and a health ily op er at ing money
mar ket has op po site ex pec ta tions to the cen tral bank, the mar ket
par tic i pants are able to con cen trate huge strength and so the cen tral
bank can hardly, or only with high cost, main tain the in stru ment.
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di rect in ter est rate de ter mi na tion of the cen tral bank would be in ef  -
fec tive.
From March 1999 the NBH in flu ences the three months credit
pric ing  with a two-week (bench mark) fixed-interest in stru ment.
(How ever, this is not re verse repo, but de posit to day, but the ef fect
would have been the same with the as set side repo). The ma tu rity
short en ing (from one month) was nec es sary not only for li quid ity
man age ment rea sons, but also be cause of the qual ity and quan tity
de vel op ment of the money mar ket.
Repo rates were al ways im por tant mea sures for the bank ing
sec tor, even dur ing the early pe riod of repo – mainly in 1994 – when
lim its were ex ceeded and the in ter bank rates ran above the repo
rates. 
the role of the repo in
the in ter est rate cor ri -
dor
The o/n cen tral bank ing rates form a cor ri dor for the in ter bank
rates. On the up per edge of the cor ri dor, the in ter est rate of the emer  -
gency repo is the the o ret i cal max i mum. In the prac tice, how ever, the 
nor ma tive repo rate is the higher edge, ex cept when an un fore seen
li quid ity prob lem oc curs.
5.3.4 Repo for sterilisation
Cen tral bank ing re verse repo is also use ful for soak ing up ex cess li  -
quid ity in the money mar ket. Fi nan cially, credit in sti tu tions place
their ex cess funds and the cen tral bank places col lat eral be hind it.
For the part ner bank the re verse repo is more ben e fi cial then the de  -
posit if the col lat eral re ceived is trans fer able dur ing the repo trans  -
ac tion. In prac tice, the pledged re verse repo (which the NBH ap  -
plied un til 1997) has no ad van tage for the mar ket over the de posit.
steri li sa tion with
re verse repo
From July 1995 the NBH steri lised a grad u ally in creas ing
amount. In the early pe riod of steri li sa tion, there was only a very
small amount of out right gov ern ment bond sales in ad di tion to the
re verse repo. The re verse repo (or the de posit) is per fectly ca pa ble
of steri lis ing mar ket li quid ity. 
In place of the repo and short term de posit, lon ger term de pos  -
its (6 and 12 months) and the NBH Bill were in tro duced for a pe riod
of time to lengthen the du ra tion of the steri lised outstandings.
5.3.5 Liquidity management by repo
A cen tral bank can ap ply repo on both sides (credit and de posit
side), so if nec es sary it can bal ance the li quid ity short age as well as
the sur plus of the mar ket. To be able to in ter vene ef fec tively on the
money mar ket when nec es sary, the cen tral bank has to have a pre  -
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quickly. In tro ducing the flex i ble repo as an in stru ment can serve the
li quid ity man age ment pur poses of the cen tral bank in the form of
ten ders or quicktenders.
The mon e tary trends of 1998 and the fall of steri lised
outstandings in Sep tem ber pre pared a good ba sis for mon i tor ing the
move ments of mar ket li quid ity more ef fec tively, and, when nec es  -
sary, for in ter ven tion. To re duce the vol a til ity of in ter bank rates and
to re duce the ef fect of a po ten tial shock a large cur rency ex change
out flow can in duce, the NBH built sev eral in stru ments of li quid ity
man age ment into its op er a tions. 
from 1999 new po ten  -
tial in stru ments for
more ac tive li quid ity
man age ment be came 
avail able
From 1999, the new “Gen eral Con di tions” in tro duced the po  -
ten tial in stru ments for more ac tive li quid ity man age ment. They also
en cour age the cen tral bank to de velop the frame work of a mon e tary
pol icy which can ac tively re duce in fla tion, even within a mod i fied ex  -
change rate sys tem.
It is pos si ble to of fer repo (or de posit) on a nor ma tive ten der,
but in the be gin ning of 1999 there was no rea son for it. How ever, the
(also new) quicktender was ap plied twice in Jan u ary.
5.4 Importance of market repo 
for the central bank
Con sidering the more ef fec tive mon e tary trans mis sion mech a nism
and in for ma tion about mar ket trends, the cen tral bank con sid ers as
one of its tar gets to as sist the de vel op ment of the money mar ket. Of
course, this ob jec tive is not more im por tant than the di rect tar gets
of mon e tary pol icy.
trad ing the se cu rity
re ceived as col lat eral
is pos si ble dur ing the
ma tu rity if de liv ery
trans ac tion is ap plied
De vel op ment of the repo mar ket en cour ages the for ma tion of a
deeper, more liq uid money mar ket. The credit lim its set be tween
banks for each other de fine its es sence, if the risk is cov ered by liq uid 
gov ern ment se cu ri ties. Trading the se cu rity re ceived as col lat eral is
pos si ble dur ing the ma tu rity if de liv ery trans ac tion is ap plied. Thus
there is a nat u ral need for a liq uid gov ern ment se cu ri ties mar ket, se  -
cure le gal in fra struc ture, and an ad e quate trad ing and set tle ment en  -
vi ron ment. 
spread ing mar ket
repo is im por tant,
since it en cour ages
riskless and short-
run credit 
op er a tions
Spreading mar ket repo is im por tant, since it en cour ages
riskless and short-run credit op er a tions. With out a repo mar ket there 
is no se cu rity be hind short credit, thus in ter est rates are higher to
cover the ex cess risk or the costs are higher for the party in need of
money, due to the trans ac tion costs of the collateralisation. Credit
costs can be made lower by es tab lish ing and im ple ment ing a repo
mar ket, and so the short ma tu rity in ter est rates can also be shrunk.
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NBH for the de vel op  -
ment of the repo
mar ket
The NBH is ca pa ble of, and in tends to en cour age the de vel op  -
ment of the Hun gar ian repo mar ket by ini ti at ing some mea sures.
First, it can ex am ine the reg u la tory and le gal en vi ron ment, as to
whether it is ca pa ble of of fer ing an op ti mal frame work for the de vel  -
op ment of the repo or not. If some com pli cat ing fac tor is dis cov ered,
it can pro pose a mea sure to deal with it.
Sec ond, the cen tral bank can look at its op er a tions and ex am  -
ine the pos si ble mod i fi ca tions in fa vour of the de vel op ment of the
repo mar ket (with out ef fi ciency loss for mon e tary pol icy).
Third, it can as sist bond-dealers and li quid ity man ag ers to be
even more aware of the po ten tial ad van tages and at trib utes of repo.
Fur ther more, the cen tral bank is ready to as sist set ting up a
gen eral agree ment on repo trans ac tions if it is nec es sary, to make
the repo more se cure and stand ard ised, thus mak ing it eas ier to
book them. Finally, the NBH can ini ti ate ways to sim plify the tech  -
niques of set tle ment, to de velop a col lat eral daily val u a tion sys tem
and the fa cil ity for sub sti tut ing col lat eral.
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Changes of central banking repo limit 
in Hungary
The amount of repo stock a part ner bank can have was lim ited from
the be gin ning. There was a nat u ral limit too, be ing the amount of the 
freely trans fer able gov ern ment se cu ri ties in the bank port fo lio ap pli  -
ca ble for collateralisation. The NBH also set up an ar ti fi cial limit
in 1993, since there were some banks with se ri ous li quid ity prob  -
lems and the un con trolled rise of mon e tary ag gre gates was not de  -
sir able. 
In the early years of cen tral bank ing repo, the repo had a daily
trans ac tion limit. That means that the daily max i mum amount of op  -
er a tions per each bank were framed for each ma tu rity. The limit was
set on the ba sis of the bal ance sheet to tal of the counterparty banks.
This was also im por tant be cause the cen tral bank had phys i cally
lim ited ca pac ity in the deal ing room. Ef fec tively, at that time, this did 
not func tion as a limit in prac tice since the to tal limit (Ft 472 bil lion)
was much higher than the de mand. It was a more the o ret i cal limit,
be cause it could halt any sharp rise of repo outstandings from one
day to an other. In March 1995 there was a rad i cal cut in these lim its,
thus mak ing them ef fec tive. The repo be came un suit able for the
func tion of “Lender of last re sort” in the long run.
The large re duc tions of the repo limit oc curred in 1995. Dur ing
the early months, main tain ing the trans ac tion limit method, the lim  -
its were cut twice. In the sec ond half of the year the method it self
changed, and a limit di rectly on the stock was in tro duced (this is still
in use). Af ter the fi nal change of the year, the bank ing sys tem to tal
limit was re duced to Ft 63.5 bil lion. How ever, li quid ity short age on
the mar ket started to dis ap pear, thus even this strict limit had lit tle
ef fect. 
Af ter the 1 Sep tem ber 1995 mod i fi ca tion, the lim its and cat e  -
go ries were un changed for a lengthy pe riod. Three years later, in
1998, the bank bal ance sheets were so di verse that the dif fer ences
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Appendixbe tween cat e go ries were not ap pro pri ate for the dif fer ences be tween
banks. And af ter the in ter na tional cri ses the pos si bil ity of a lon ger
term li quid ity short age was loom ing, and it ap peared the credit in sti  -
tu tions would be more will ing to ap ply for cen tral bank ing repo. Pre  -
paring for that, the NBH made a new sys tem of limit, but still used the 
stock limit method. 
The mod i fi ca tion ended the cat e go ries and the banks are au to  -
mat i cally en ti tled to the amount in the limit, which is re vised once
ev ery three months. The new limit reg u la tion gives the banks a close
to fixed per cent age of their bal ance sheet to tal as max i mum repo
limit. The size of the limit is Ft 200 mil lion, plus Ft 200 mil lion for ev  -
ery Ft 10 bil lion of the bal ance sheet to tal, but it can never be more
than Ft 12 bil lion, or Ft 20 bil lion from 1 June 1999. 
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Ta ble  1
Changes of the transaction limit in 1995
Ft bil lion
Transaction limit From 20 March 1995 From 2 May 1995
Bal ance sheet




can hold uti lis  -
ing the full
daily trans ac -
tion limit ev ery 
day
How much of
the max i mum
stock can be in 
one week ma  -
tu rity repo 
Max i mum
stock a bank
can hold uti lis  -
ing the full
daily trans ac -
tion limit ev ery 
day
How much of
the max i mum
stock can be
in one week
ma tu rity repo
Above 400 – – 8,00   0,50
 100–400 8,00   1,00 5,00   0,50
 20–100 2,00   1,00 2,00   0,25
 10–20 1,00   0,50 0,60   0,10
 Bel low 10 0,50   0,25 0,18   0,08
To tal repo limit 
of the sec tor 220,00 130,00
Ta ble 2
Changes of the stock repo limit in 1995
Ft bil lion
Stock limit system Maximum daily repo stock
Bal ance sheet to tal of the
bank
From the 1  July 1995 From the 1 Sep tem ber
1995
Above 400  10,0  8,0
100–400   7,0  4,2
35–100   3,0  1,8
15–35   1,0  0,6
Be low 15   0,5  0,3
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Chart 1  Repo and swap limit changes in 1998 Ap pen dix No. 2
Repo, reverse repo and deposit in the “General
Conditions of the Forint Money Market
Operations”
From 4 Jan u ary 1999 a mod i fied ver sion of the “Gen eral Con di  -
tions” came into op er a tion, in volv ing some changes for cen tral
bank ing repo. 
 The pledged re verse repo and the de posit are, le gally, treated
dif fer ently in the reg u la tion, but their eco nomic con tent is ba si cally
the same. 
Cen tral bank ing repo can be sold in sev eral forms. The NBH
can ap ply stand ing fa cil ity, pe ri odic stand ing fa cil ity (open only on
some days as stand ing fa cil ity), ten der and quicktender. De liv ery
repo can also be ap plied. 
The dif fer ences of quicktender in re la tion to ten der are as fol  -
lows:
• the time for bids is only 30 min utes, as against 3 hours,
• there is 30 min utes for the eval u a tion of bids, as against
2 hours,
• T-day set tle ment, as against T+1,
• only banks are al lowed to par tic i pate, as against banks plus
spe cial credit in sti tu tions,
• the NBH only ac cepts bids com ing by Reuters Deal ing, not by 
fax,
• one in sti tu tion can make only one bid, as against the five.
The ten ders can ap pear in many forms such as fixed quan tity
ten der, fixed in ter est rate ten der, lim ited quan tity fixed in ter est rate
ten der or un con di tioned ten der (no pre fixed amount and in ter est).
The in ter est rate ten der is ba si cally the same as the pe ri odic
stand ing fa cil ity. The NBH ac cepts each bid on the pre fixed in ter est
rate. The in ter est rate ten der dif fers from the pe ri odic stand ing fa cil  -
ity in some for mal as pects (mak ing the of fer, pub lish ing the re sult,
etc.) and in the reg u lar ity of their oc ca sions; the call for a ten der is
not reg u lar, but re fers to a dis crete date.
The lim ited quan tity fixed in ter est rate ten der dif fers from the
in ter est rate ten der in the quan tity limit. Thus in this case the NBH
ac cepts bids only up to the limit. The NBH main tains the right to
change the amount of of fer af ter the bids are sub mit ted. If de mand
ex ceeds the of fer, the bids are al lo cated pro por tion ately.
In call ing for a quan tity ten der, only the amount of fered is fixed
in ad vance. The counterparties bid for the in ter est rate ac com pa ny  -
ing the amount. The NBH ac cepts the most ben e fi cial bids in or der,
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right to change the amount of of fer af ter the bids are sub mit ted.
The un con di tional ten der call con tains the date, ma tu rity, sub  -
type, but not the in ter est rate and the amount. The coun ter parts give
bids for the in ter est rate as so ci ated with an amount, and af ter all the
bids are sub mit ted the NBH ar ranges them to or der and starts to ac  -
cept them from the most to the least ad van ta geous up to a limit that
ap pears ideal for the NBH.
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